Programme

The Canadian fur trade (i.e. mercantilism) was a particular means for the spatial spread of market relations. Because the export of furs for commercial gain was so successful, the political economy of the fur trade significantly shaped the development of British North America. For some time, the relationship between European traders and Aboriginal fur producers was largely ignored by historians, but later, this relationship was constructed as a perfectly benign process, best referred to as a “partnership.” Native involvement in post fur trade regional economies, which can be characterized as resource frontier capitalism, was underappreciated until recently. However, given the absence of an explicitly economic understanding of the fur trade and the need to account for observations documenting native integration with new demands for labour, a fallacy of difference had to be invoked in order to account for Natives working for wages. In order to culturally differentiate Natives from White workers, it has been asserted that participation in wage labour was entirely selective and occurred only to strengthen traditional cultural practices. Alternatively, several studies regard the involvement in the fur trade and/or wage labour as purely and simply exploitative and coercive dynamics. While mainstream Canadian historians loudly decry the colonialization of Native peoples, the current orthodoxy rests on a belief that colonialism, recklessly pursued by the state and churches, is essentially a cultural process. Consequently, this view infers that neither the fur trade nor resource frontier capitalism are associated with colonialism, and thus, the sale of labour was not especially disruptive. A more precise historical understanding of native responses to colonial labour demands would be informed by political economy concepts and economic terminology.

This paper discusses the recruitment process, the socio-economic origins, demographic and other characteristics of migrants from India who went to the then sugar colonies as indentured labourers. The emergence of specific areas as sources of labour supply, the role of the colonial state and its policies, the mechanisms of securing the labour supply are investigated. Annual fluctuations in the number of recruits and emigrants, from northern India, which was the most important source of labour supply for the colonies, as a whole and from important individual districts, are analysed to delineate the roles of demand and supply factors, and to examine the widely held views. The economic history of the northern labour supplying region and the wider role of colonial economic policies in creating an excess supply of destitute in the region which was actually prosperous before colonial rule are discussed.

Abstract: Considerable research has been conducted in northern Canada documenting the continuation and strength of the “traditional” bush economy in Indigenous communities. It is argued that hunting and gathering practices continue to contribute to a substantial portion of the economies of many of these communities and that seasonal employment in the larger wage economy is sought primarily as a means to supplement this traditional “life-on-the-land.” While such research has much value and does reflect a more complex reality for Indigenous communities then previously assumed, it rarely considers the historical context of this type of economy. There appears to be an unstated assumption that this scenario has always existed since wage economies were introduced. However, what is forgotten is that in Canada and elsewhere in the world Indigenous peoples have been actively involved in commercial economies since at least the seventeenth century. Thus, the question becomes, is the contemporary pattern of engaging in seasonal wage employment to support a “life-on-the-land” a recent phenomenon or is it something that existed in an historical context? This paper attempts to explore this question through an analysis of fur trade post and whaling station journals and account books, documenting the participation of Indigenous peoples in these early commercial industries at the Ile a la Crosse post in northern Canada and the Otakou shore whaling station in southern New Zealand. Through these cycles, an understanding of the pattern of Indigenous peoples’ engagement in commercial activities can be developed. These patterns can provide a much-needed historical context to better understand contemporary realities.

Recent economic history scholarship has recognized the importance of motivations and pathways of legislation as core elements forming the institutional environment of economic growth. Much of this literature has focused on property rights, and more tangentially, contract law. This paper instead considers legislation concerning employment relations in the context of one colonial region that pioneered labour legislation in the developing world. Often seen as a set of measures to help nineteenth century European planters and mill-owners retain otherwise footloose, supposedly undisciplined and unreliable, workers recruited from traditional occupations, colonial labour legislation in India evolved, like property rights, by being subject to influences that were diverse and both foreign and local in origin. The presence or absence of an indigenous law of contract, the evolution of a labour market, colonial precedents, and political mobilization, played a part, in varying combination over time in structuring labour law. Local institutional heritage and factor markets, the paper argues, played as large a role as did class and colonial capitalism in the framing of factories acts in India.

In the late 19th century, European societies witnessed a series of spectacular corruption cases. For a long time historical research assumed that this was largely the result of a general change in values which led to a heightened public awareness of corruption. The present paper, instead, argues that a new type of corruption emerged around that time which was fundamentally different from the previous systems of patronage and clientelism.
Two economic theories are commonly employed to explain the phenomenon: 1. The rent-seeking theory focuses on the role of private agents who bribe officials for personal gain in order to procure an income surplus which they wouldn’t realise under market conditions. 2. New Institutional Economics views principal-agent problems (information asymmetries) as the prime cause of corruption.
My empirical analysis centres on two cases which are typical for the time around 1900 and which are well-documented due to their legal prosecution: the Panama Affair of 1892 and the scandal of the Banca Romana in 1893.
Based on these two case studies the following hypotheses can be formulated to explain the growth of corruption:

1. Spectacular corruption cases occur in networks where several principal-agent problems overlap and interfere with each other.
2. Since corrupt contracts involve high transaction costs, personal and family relationships, shared norms and values play a crucial role in the emergence of corrupt structures. Furthermore, high exit costs make it difficult to end corrupt contracts and therefore lead to a high degree of stability.
3. Traditional systems of patronage have not been entirely displaced but continue to exist in altered form after having merged with modern forms of corruption.
4. The growth of the public sector around 1900 provided many new opportunities for corruption and abuse of office. This is especially evident in connection with state investments in infrastructure.
5. As private enterprises and their organisational structures grew, this created new agency problems and opened gateways for opportunistic behaviour.
6. The spread of corruption in the late 19th century is also related to changes in the
political order. In periods of economic and political transformation, property rights tend to become unclear, thereby facilitating corruption.
7. In the late 19th century new legislation was introduced that made bribing of
officials and buying of votes liable to prosecution. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, prosecution externalised costs of private business relations. Public scandals had the same effect. As corrupt acts became morally charged and public awareness grew, corrupt actors had to face damages to their reputation.

Since the Middle Ages, godparenthood has been used as a means for formalizing and ritualizing social ties. In the earlier period, the establishment of a relationship of comparatico (the tie between the parents of the baptized child and his or her godparents) could imply that a social relationship already existing was reaffirmed in a formal way, or that a new relationship or tie was established through a specific ceremony. Godparenthood transformed who was tied by it in kinsmen (more precisely, spiritual kinsmen) and brought divine protection upon the tie itself: thus allowing for the establishment of trust between the parties. It was then widely used to consolidate economic relationships (for ex. among merchants).
In Catholic Europe, the Council of Trent (ended 1563) caused the verticalization of godparenthood, that came to increasingly resemble an instrument to establish relationships of patronage or social clientele. This transformation is at the root of some “morally hazardous” uses of godparenthood still to be found in Italy as well as in the rest of Catholic Europe: for example, the “political godparenthood” used in Southern Italy and elsewhere in the peninsula to consolidate a base of voters, or the habit of establishing godparenthood ties between entrepreneurs and politicians: ties, that might become the vehicle for collusion, corruption and similar.
If these uses of godparenthood are not (or not always) properly criminal or unethical– but simply morally hazardous, the use of godparenthood within Mafia families and other Italian (or Italian-American) criminal organizations is a fact. In these environments, godparenthood becomes an instrument to integrate newcomers into the criminal family; to stop or prevent feuds and vendettas; to establish trust within a dark network of criminal actors; to create privileged relationships with (again) politicians, entrepreneurs, and others.

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In the 19th century the City of London was the most important finnacial centre in the world. Not only did it grow in size and sophitication but its reach became truly global, extending far beyond Britian's own Empire. However, rather than be a source of pride for the British people the City of london was a byword for greed, corruption and the abuse of power. To many it was resented as a source of malign foreign influence while, to others, it was a place where innocent investors were swindled out of their savings. By using contemporary sources, especially novels written at the time, this paper attempts to identify the prevailing views on the City of london as a financial centre and contrast them with its ongoing development as a global financial centre.

Power and trust represent the proverbial two sides of the same coin and at the same time stand for strategic alternatives. While recent research, building on Luhmann, has focused on trust as a means of reducing transaction costs and complexity it has tended to neglect power – in fact, another medium of information and interaction suggested by Luhmann – as a key factor in conducting business. By means of a case study the presentation will argue that corruption brings together both media, in fact, that it builds on an intricate interplay of power and trust.
Power in different forms is traded in corrupt deals which are usually clandestine and highly confidential. The trade can implicate a variety of material or immaterial goods such as access to information, the ability to influence decision-making processes, the allocation of resources, or money, all of which require (and represent) power in order to be furnished according to the agreements made by the protagonists involved. Trust is the essential prerequisite to make corruption both effective and efficient (as opposed to blackmailing for instance). Compliance with agreements which incriminate both sides can usually not be legally enforced or will entail particularly high transaction costs (material expenditure, risks of prosecution, additional illegal action, etc.). In these scenarios, trust substitutes costly supervision. However, corruption not only builds on trust but also helps jeopardizing it if agreements are not honoured or if the matters involved become known to outsiders with competing interests. Under such circumstances power helps to soften the consequences or even allows ignoring the harmful side-effects of distrust altogether. On yet another level, corruption is most efficiently curbed by the countervailing power of institutional checks and balances or of an informed public.

The paper investigates the multiple corruption regimes in the 1920s United States. It contends that under certain political conditions corruption is not pathological for the functioning of a political system but rather a necessary means to keep it running. The paper then investigates how these corruption regimes changed under the influence of National Prohibition and the thriving alcohol shadow economy. It concludes that the Prohibition money overstretched the corruption ties in the long run and threatened to stall the political institutions in cities like Chicago or New York City. This led to a public reaction against corruption which entailed the repeal of Prohibition in 1933.

The re-organisation of Kami-shiojiri Gonin-gumi (the equivalent of the English frankpledge) system occurred in 1832. This was just before the Great Famine period of Tenpo (1833-1836), one of the four nationwide great famines in the Edo period (1603-1868). As a result of the re-organisation, the Gonin-gumi team became based on the neighbourhood, having previously been founded on kin relationships. The re-organisation was based on the reality of residence, so in the difficult period of bad harvests, the villagers adapted to the circumstances utilising kin networks effectively as well as the new Gonin-gumi system. In particular, in the Ueda-han domain which our Kami-shiojiri belonged to, it is true that some mountainous villages saw 'starving people (ki-nin)' and there are records of substantial numbers of people suffering from the disease sometimes caused by malnutrition. Nevertheless, as a overall there are hardly any instances of anything approaching starvation. Our research group share this impression.
As a matter of fact, the period certainly covers the great famine or at least an extremely bad harvest. However, the villagers responded tosuch circumstances calmly, and the resilience of the village during this extra-ordinary period has several different features. From the demographic point of view, the population of the village remained at around 800 throughout the research period, but this particular tenpo period barely shows any fluctuations. Yet the fluctuations are far from wide due to the image of the famine. However, it could be argued that the combination of responses to the bad harvests at several levels including by individuals, families and kin relationships or by political and administrative activities by the Han domain or Bakuhu central government resulted in such calmness. After a lot of initial turmoil under the serious crisis,, there was relatively less damage than might be assumed.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to find cases of people starving to death but this was generally recorded as 'falling dead on the roadside (yukidaore)' and such a record was usually treated as an event, concerning outsiders and not as something that had happened inside the village. Moreover, it is also likely that one can find some outsiders living from hand to mouth who came to this village by way of Kami-shiojiri 'relatives' to settle down. Yet I have not come across any records for the bad harvest period to describe such immigration. Paradoxically, during a lean harvest, if not famine, it becomes much less affordable for people to keep records. On the one hand, the relatively prosperous families with holdings and sufficient status to pass all this on by inheritance were not likely to be among those who died of starvation. On the other hand, some 'honke (main branch family)' distributed or divided the property among the 'bunkes (stemmed branch family)' as a means of support, and accordingly losing their vigor and influence. The trigger of such a decline was often a famine or bad harvest such as the one under consideration here. We can find an appropriate example in Kami-shiojiri during the Tenpo famine period.

Famine is caused by lean harvest. But lean harvest does not necessarily lead to famine. The case of the Tenpo famine in the Ueda Han Domain was kinds of such case. The bad harvest attacked the East part of Japan Island in 1833 and 1836. In the Northeast Japan, many people faced the serious shortage of food and some dead for them. But the Ueda Domain, situated at the middle part of Island, did not face so terrible famine in that period. This paper aimed to analyze the reason of this phenomenon from the view point of socio-economic history.

The purpose of this report is to investigate the provisions against bad harvest in Kami-shiojiri village, Ueda, Shinano, Japan. Ueda Han domain commanded every village to save grain in 1711. Following for the policy of the Tokugawa shogunate, Ueda Han domain established the saving grain system in 1791. This saving grain was used to rescue the poor in Tenpo famine in 1833. Ueda Han domain commanded each sets of villages (Kumi) to save grain in 1830.
And after the 1830’s, the ‘Eizoku-ko’ (the lasting mutual financing association) was established on the instructions of the Ueda Han domain as a precaution against famine. The Ueda han domain approved the Eizoku-ko, and part of the money was paid to it by associations. Eizoku-ko consisted of about 30 associations in Kami-shiojiri village. Each association’s membership numbered about 20. Each association convened a meeting twice a year. All members who attend the meeting had saved money to avoid dying out as a household unit. And all members shared in the profits once a year. The transfer of the rights of the shareholder was prohibited, and the member could not withdraw any of the saved money. Each association lent money with the land used as security. When a member inherited, he signed and stamped the ledger. Every member of the association had to submit a copy of his will. In the will, every member swore that if his descendant committed a crime or did something wrong, he would be expelled from the association. The provision against famine in Kami-shiojiri village played the role in the foundation of the regional financial association.

The Tenpo Famine in 1830s is one of the worst famines in Tokugawa Japan. The lean harvests are considered to be caused or triggered by cool weather in some summer seasons in the period. In the absence of scientific meteorological observations, the climate at that time has been estimated by climatologic studies based on daily weather records of old diaries and by the dendroclimatological studies analyzing tree rings. According to existing studies, the climatic situation of the Tenpo period can be reconstructed as follows. Summers in the Tenpo period (1830s) were generally cool and rainy in central and northeastern Japan, and the Baiu rainy season before full summer lasted longer than usual in that period. Typhoons as well as low temperatures in summer devastated the poor harvest, especially in 1833 and 1836, the severest years of the Tenpo period.
The condition of damage due to cool weather in Kami-shiojiri is interpreted as follows. Kami-shiojiri is located at a lower altitude in the Ueda domain, inherently advantageous in terms of location, namely, temperature. On the other hand, the land use in Kami-shiojiri was overwhelmingly paddy fields. In case of particularly cool weather such as in 1833 and 1836, Kami-shiojiri is especially vulnerable to crop damage because of its dependence on rice cultivation.

The subject of this report is a consideration of what the bad harvest of Tenpo impacted on the land holding and farming in Japanese village.
　According to the generally accepted theory, Japanese rural society was badly damaged by this Tenpo-Bad Harvest. In particular, some researchers point out that the development of market-economy increased the damage.
　Also, I would like to investigate from the aspect of land holding and farming the factual influence of the bad harvest of Tenpo on Japanese rural society where market economy had developed. Because we apt to pay attention to the accumulation of land by rich farmers, the loss by small-hold farmers, the rise of tenanted land rate, and the increase of small-scale tenant farmers, when we find the great effect on rural by bad harvest. Are such recognition based on facts? This report confirms whether above- mentioned facts have really resulted or not, from the case of Kami-shiojiri village in Ueda domain of central Japan. The bottom line is that Kami-shiojiri village coped the bad harvest of Tenpo and we can‘t find the effects of bad harvest on land holding or farming.
Kami-shiojiri village surely had a bad harvest in 1833 and 1836. We can recognize particularly active land transfer in the 1830s. We can also find that small mortgage loan intensified in the 1830s. However, the accumulation of land holding by rich farmers did not result and the equalization of land holding was brought about. In the respect of farming, the rise of tenanted land rate was almost unalterable and the number of tenant farmers did not so increase.
Also, we cha say that the effects of bad harvest of Tenpo on Kami-shiojiri village was restricted. Kami-shiojiri village had resistance to bad harvest

The paper consists of three sections: A, B & C. In section A my focus is on the years 1850-1900. As budget inquiries show, during that period Amsterdam working-class people really were poor. This meant that they had to keep away from the savings-bank. But it didn't mean that they refrained from every type of saving. We can observe a general tendency to contribute to funeral and sickness funds. Section B deals with the years 1900-1940. Evidence from budget inquiries demonstrates that there was an increase in saving capacity. Growing numbers of workers became bankdepositors. Part of this section is on the popularity of the 'moneybox system for savings' amongst the Amsterdam working-class. In section C it's back to poverty again: I'll devote my attention to those who were so unfortunate as to fall victim to usurers around the 1900s. For the greater part this concluding section is based on the writings of the Dutch author Israël Querido (1872-1932), who got very much worked up about women shylocks operating in an Amsterdam working-class quarter.

G.N. (GERARD) BORST
reseacher Financial Culture
GELDMUSEUM
Collections & Research Department
PO BOX 2407, 3500 GK UTRECHT – THE NETHERLANDS
t.: (+31)(0)30-2143362
f.: (+31)(0)30-2910467
m.: (+31)(0)614387650
e.: g.borst@geldmuseum.nl
w.: www.geldmuseum.nl

Current quantative studies of the Finnish households start from the middle of 1960’s. The reason is that there are no easily useable micro sources available before this period. The first consumption survey in electronic format is from 1966. The few existing economic history analyses concerning the 1950’s Finnish households are based on the growth studies.
Additionally, saving is not very often researched topic in the economic history. One reason for the lack of the studies might be the difficulty of estimating saving. However, saving is an important topic as savings allow investing and thus, it is a criterion for the modern growth. Additionally, saving can be assumed to be some kind of indication welfare or excess income. This paper estimates savings for different types of employee households.
The paper focuses on the saving behaviour of the Finnish employee households but as it is not possible to analyse saving without income and consumption, it discusses also these issues. This paper presents first results of a broader study. As the households have to have the excess income before even considering saving, the paper discusses the development of welfare from the saving point of view.
As a tool for this analysis, the paper estimates unbalanced sector accounts and private consumption for 1950/51 and 1955/56 Finnish employee households by using old consumption surveys from these periods. As a method this is standard national accounting but it is not often applied to economic history.

Working-class saving in the late 19th and the early 20th century Sweden

Sweden had as many other European countries during the nineteenth century, a fast growing population. The number of inhabitants more than reduplicated between 1800 (2.4 million) and 1900 (5.1 million), but since more than one million inhabitants also emigrated during the same period of time, the increase was in fact even higher. Parallel with this population growth there were also other changes that deeply affected the economy. In the beginning of the 19th century, agriculture was still the dominating livelihood with 90 per cent of the Swedish population living on the countryside and the land was in main part owned by free holding peasants. As a result of the agrarian revolution that had started in the end of the 18th century production rose and a social differentiation started. The farming land area grew, but the number of peasants was almost unchanged and instead there was a fast growing proletarianization. The number of unpropertied persons in the countryside grew more than four-fold between 1750 and 1850.

The economic expansion that came with the agrarian revolution led, parallel with a mounting proto-industrialization, to expanding markets and conditions were set for the industrialization to come. In Sweden, the latter took off from the middle of the nineteenth century. Domestic raw materials were essential in the first wave of industrialization and hence factories were to a large extent founded on the countryside. As a consequence almost 70 per cent of the Swedish population still lived on the countryside in 1900.

The workers in those early factories frequently lived in hard economic and social circumstances. There were a profound lack of living space, bad sanitary conditions, illnesses were common and wages low. Despite this, there is a consensus among Swedish researchers that workers’ wages and living conditions were slowly improving already in the beginning of the industrialization period. This growing income could be used for consumption or/and for saving. The need for precautionary saving was in fact large, as the terms of employment were insecure and employment irregular. Making workers save money was seen as something most important not least from the authorities’ point of view. They (the authorities) thought savings could function as an important reserve in case of loss of income. Rising incomes during industrialization were, however, probably primarily used for immediate consumption as the incomes in reality were so low and the propensity to consume high for the average worker.

The Swedish real wages were low even in an European perspective. However, at the end of the 19th century they started to rise fastly and Sweden has been considered as an example of catch-up during the economic internationalization at the end of the nineteenth century. The Swedish wages were only 52 per cent of the British in 1870 but had surpassed the latter in 1910. The rise in wages occurred primarily during the second wave of industrialization in the 1890s when also the industrial production as well as the economic growth escalated. The growth in real wages resulted in growing consumption and the domestic market became more important. It is reasonable to presume that the conditions for workers to save greatly improved during this time.

Statistics with regard to deposits give us a brief view of savings in the financial sector. Total savings were only small in the middle of the 19th century but grew enormously until 1913. Growth was extremely fast during the boom years around 1870. The growth in total deposit was four-fold between 1868 and 1876. This development has been labelled “a deposit market revolution”. Deposits were fourteen times larger (constant prices) in 1913 than in 1870. In what extent had workers part in this large growth of deposits?

The aim of this paper is to depict the development of working-class saving in Sweden and to discuss when a more general breakthrough occurred.

Statistical data and previous research indicates that a breakthrough for a general working-class saving occurred in the decades around 1900. During the inter-war years a more mature phase was achieved as more family members saved and also saved larger amounts. Furthermore they more often than before used different forms of savings institutions.

Kristina Lilja
kristina.lilja@ekhist.uu.se
Department of Economic history
Uppsala University, Sweden

This paper examines the relative failure of community credit unions in Britain. Often put forward as mutual alternatives to high cost doorstep moneylenders, Britain's credit unions have failed to meet this challenge since their arrival in the 1960s. By comparing the success of credit unions in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, the paper identifies the factors that were present in both those localities that assisted credit union growth, but which were absent in Britain.

In the beginning of 1914 the Ford Motor Company started impressive profit-sharing program called “Five Dollars Day”. Its purpose was paternalistic, aimed at cultivation of “good employees” among US-born and immigrant workers at the automobile plant in Detroit. The workforce consisted of 58 nationalities from all parts of the world. Sociological Department accumulated statistical data on their bank savings, personal debts, buying real estates, living conditions, habits, etc. About half of 40,903 workmen in January, 1917, were American-born and naturalized aliens. The most numerous groups of immigrants without US citizenship were Poles, Italians, Canadians, Romanians, Jews, Germans, Russians, and Englishmen. Russians looked superior, good or satisfactory in many points, especially in bank savings, in comparison to Americans, Canadians and West European immigrants. Meanwhile, Russians had shown another type of economic behavior – saving money rather than buying land and houses.

We provide annual estimates of GDP for England between 1300 and 1700 and for Great Britain between 1700 and 1850, constructed from the output side. The GDP data are combined with population estimates to calculate GDP per capita. Estimates of nominal GDP are also provided by combining the volume series with price indices. Previous studies, based on the analysis of daily real wages, have found no trend growth before the late eighteenth century. In contrast, we find English per capita income growth of 0.13 per cent per annum between 1300 and 1700, with the strongest growth after the Black Death and in the second half of the seventeenth century. For the period 1700-1850, we find British per capita income growth of 0.25 per cent, broadly in line with the widely accepted Crafts/Harley estimates. The modest trend growth in per capita income before the Industrial Revolution can be reconciled with the stability of daily real wages because of an “industrious revolution”, increasing the days worked per year.

Estimates of GDP per capita for up to 8 European countries (Belgium, Germany, GB/UK, Italy, Netherlands, Ottoman Turkey, Spain, and Sweden) from c.1300 to 1820/1850 AD are summarised and compared. The 2003 estimates by Maddison are contrasted with the more recent estimates for individual countries presented in this session, which argue for slower growth from a higher starting base. It is suggested that the relatively high per capita GDP of much of north-western Europe by c.1300 may have been due to high value added by the region's mixed agriculture.

The last decades there has been a growing consensus that economic growth in the early stages of the industrial revolution was considerably slower than hitertho had been supposed. This claim is tested for the Belgian case.

The purpose of the paper is the statistical reconstruction of a yearly series of per capita output in Central-Northern Italy between 1300 and 1913. The several phases of the statistical procedures and the results are presented, tested and discussed. The trend of per capita GDP is downward bent since the Renaissance until the 1880s, when modern growth starts.

Abstract: Money supply and GDP in England 1065-1700

This paper sets estimates of English money supply alongside a series of estimates of population and GDP for a series of dates between 1065 and 1700. Using the Fisher Quantity Theory equation permits us to derive a number for Velocity, which serves as an indicator of monetisation. This method, which I applied in 1995, is brought up to date in the light of current work on GDP, also presented by Broadberry, Campbell et al. at the Utrecht WEHC.

This paper extends estimates for Ottoman GDP per capita backwards from 1820 towards 1500 by making use of wage rates for Istanbul and urbanization rates for the Empire as a whole. The paper begins by establishing a relationship between wage rates and urbanization rates, on the one hand, and GDP per capita on the other, for six European countries for the period 1500-1820. The Ottoman case is then inserted into this framework.

The paper produces a national product estimate at intervals of 50 years on the basis of a food
consumption function and the share of the non- agricultural population. The major results of this
investigation are: (1) Growth of per capita income was negative in the sixteenth and positive
during the first half of the seventeenth century. This shift can be interpreted within a Malthusian
framework: population grew strongly during the first period and was decimated in the wake of
the Thirty Years War. Net of the positive income effect of the population loss there actually was
a decline of welfare during the first half of the seventeenth century. (2) During c. 1700 to 1850
GDP p. c. shows a modest positive growth rate of 0.2 percent p. a., despite a resumption of
population growth. This experience sets Germany apart from the stagnant economies of
Southern Europe. It can be interpreted as an effect of market integration, which stabilized labour productivity in the agrarian sector through the benefits of regional specialization and created new employment opportunities through the expansion of export markets for manufactures. (3) The evidence produced by this study strongly suggests a higher level of economic activity around 1850 than earlier research has suggested. This supports a gradualist perspective on the transition to
modern growth: between the late 1840s and the 1870s, when German industrialization took off,
per capita GDP may have grown no faster than 0.4 per cent annually.

No consensus exists about when Spain fell behind. In fact, some historians have questioned that a rise of Spain that would have taken her to a prominent position in Europe ever happened. In spite a hot and long-lasting debate on her historical decline Spain has always been considered in isolation and hardly any attempts have been made at quantifying her economic performance. This paper investigates when did the rise of Spain begin and when the decline occur by examining the available evidence about her economic performance over a millennium (800-1850). We estimate movements in agricultural consumption and output using a demand function approach, while we proxy output trends in industry and services through changes in urban population (adjusted to exclude those living on agriculture), so tendencies in total output and output per head can be established at regional and national level. Finally, Spain’s position within Western Europe is re-examined. Our findings suggest that per capita income increased over 800-1300, declined from the mid-14th to the early 15th century, and, then, recovered in the late 15th to exhibit sustained growth in the 16th century, falling back, again, in the 17th century, roughly stagnating over the 18th century, and growing, again, in the early 19th century. Thus, it can be suggested that at the time of her imperial expansion Spain was a relatively affluent nation and, by 1590, was only behind the Low Countries and Italy in terms of per capita income. Spain’s decline has its roots in the seventeenth century while her backwardness deepened in the first half of the nineteenth century.

The paper firstly discusses links between a bench mark of Swedish national income in 1570 and the current Historical National Accounts of Sweden from 1800 onwards. The bench mark indicates a roughly similar level of income per capita at these points. A number of indicators connecting these benchmarks are analyzed, such as population growth, wages and prices, sectoral composition of the economy, exports and degree of urbanization. Secondly, the paper treats the marked expansion of the Swedish economy from 1820 up to 1850, particularly analysing the relation between population growth, wages, agricultural transformation and the rise of an export surplus of grain, and early industrialisation.

The early beginnings of the process of modern economic growth is still rather unclear, which also makes it more difficult to test various hypotheses about the origins of the process – for example related to the role played by institutional change (such as the Glorious Revolution), technological development, or relative prices (as suggested by Allen 2009). The problem becomes even more complex when we broaden the scope and include other countries into the inquiry. In their seminal study on ‘The First Modern Economy’, De Vries and Van der Woude (1997) have argued that the Dutch economy already during the 17th century generated a first wave of ‘modern economic growth’, resulting in substantial gains in income per capita and in real wages. They use a much broader definition of modernity, however, and to a large extent focus on the functioning of institutions, government and markets, but also point to the substantial increases of real incomes that must have occurred during the Dutch ‘Golden Age’. There is probably consensus about most of what de Vries and Van der Woude claim to be characteristics of a modern economy. The ‘weakest link’ in this argument appears to be the issue whether Holland was ‘capable of sustained development’.
The problem we try to deal with in this paper is this issue: did the Netherlands economy, more specifically Holland, generate a process of ‘modern economic growth’ in the early modern period? During which periods did real GDP per capita increase, and when did it stop growing? And how did the growth in real incomes relate to structural change of the economy? And, assuming that De Vries and Van der Woude are correct, that institutions were indeed remarkably modern already in the 16th and 17th century, why did this ‘first modern economy’ cease to generate growth and structural change after 1650 and 1670?
The answering of these questions has been severely constrained by data problems, in particular by the lack of consistent estimates of the national accounts of the country for the period involved. As a result, research has been based on various indirect indicators of economic performance. Therefore, this paper sets the further goal of creating national accounts for Holland for the period 1510-1807.

The Domesday Survey provides the first comprehensive national survey of any economy. The availability of two complementary data sources allows a direct estimate of Tenant-in-Chief’s lands from the Survey. By providing a means to identifying the extent of arable activity outside the demesne, as well as the extent that ploughs working on the lords estates were active in the peasant economy, I provide a transparent method of estimating the extent of non-seigniorial production. After incorporating a series of other elements valued in the Survey, and adding these to the seigniorial and non-seigniorial agricultural production estimates, we derive an estimate for the income of Domesday England in 1086. The findings are consistent with an important interpretation of the Domesday text proposed by Bridbury that is further developed conceptually. Furthermore, a ‘full capacity’ 1086 estimate, determined under differing assumptions concerning population, price, and climatic conditions, is compared against recent estimates for the earliest benchmark period circa 1300.

This paper revisits the long studied question on why Governments repay their debts, and focus
on trade reduction in post-default periods. I argue that a main link through which sovereign
defaults affected trade in the late 19th century were financial intermediaries’ credit
restrictions. By analysing the functioning and industrial organization of sovereign debt
markets and the business for trade finance, we conclude the following. First, this paper
demonstrates that the most important underwriters for sovereign debt were also very active in
international trade finance. Second, looking at archival evidence from Baring Brothers, I show
that the bank strongly reduced its exposure to Argentina after the 1890 crisis, held less
Argentinean securities in its portfolio and reduced its trade credit—overall and in particular
towards Argentina. And third, for the period of 1870-1913 this paper argues that those
countries with stronger bilateral trade with Great Britain and who had one underwriter for
their sovereign debt issues also defaulted less. It is thus not about sanctions, but about
economics, pretty much as it is today.

Scholars differ as to how much impact an increased role by the Federal Reserve would have had in halting U.S. banking panics during the Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz suggest that banking panics were exacerbated by the Fed’s unwillingness or inability to act as a lender of last resort whereas Calomiris and Mason argue that most bank failures during the Great Depression resulted from insolvency, implying central bank intervention would have done little to stop bank failures. We shed light on this debate by examining the last banking panic prior to the start of the Great Depression. In the spring of 1929, a fruit fly epidemic struck Florida and the U.S. government quarantined Florida citrus fruit. In July, banks in citrus growing areas and Tampa faced heavy withdrawals as depositors worried about asset quality. These withdrawals led some banks to suspend payment, prompting depositor runs on correspondent banks. In response, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta rushed currency member banks in Tampa to halt the spread of the panic. The Fed’s actions allow us to test directly the role of lender of last resort liquidity provision in halting banking panics. We assemble a new micro-level database on commercial banks in Florida and test whether, all else equal, banks receiving Federal Reserve infusions had a greater probability of surviving the panic.

The paper examines several financial crises in US history in order to study examples of effective and ineffective crisis management. The results are used as a basis for commenting on the management of the current crisis of 2007-2009.

The first nationwide twentieth century real estate “bubble” appeared in the early 1920s and burst in 1926. While fundamentals, including a post-war construction catch-up, low interest rates and a “Greenspan put,” played a role in its inception, the boom developed its own momentum, particularly in hot regional markets, including Florida. Financial innovation and lax supervision contributed to the upswing. Alternative monetary policies would have dampened but not eliminated the boom. Its collapse caused foreclosures to rise and weakened households’ balance sheets on the eve of the stock market crash and the Great Depression.

By the eighteenth century, Europeans dominated the military technology of gunpowder weapons. Their dominance was surprising, because the technology had originated in China and had been used with expertise in East and South Asia and the Ottoman Empire. Historians have often invoked competition to account for the Europeans’ military prowess, but competition cannot explain why they forged ahead in developing this technology. The answer lies in the peculiar form that military competition took in western Europe: it was a tournament that induced European rulers to invest heavily in improving the technology of gunpowder weapons. Political incentives and military conditions kept such a tournament from developing in China, Japan, India, and the Ottoman Empire, and as a result rulers had much less reason to push the gunpowder technology, which had enormous advantages for fighting war at a distance.

All knowledgeable sources agree that prize money payable for the capture of enemy vessels was an integral part of the compensation—and motivation—system of the Royal Navy in the age of sail. The evidence for this view is scant, however, because there are no comprehensive estimates of the prize money actually paid to crews of British ships. I construct and examine a twenty percent random sample of all prizes taken by the British Royal Navy during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of 1793-1815. Contrary to common wisdom, prizes remained lucrative until nearly the end of the wars. I confirm the common view that frigates offered lucrative prize earnings, but I also find that third rate ships of the line had high annual earnings. For admirals, captains, and commanders prize money was the sine qua non of compensation, exceeding (sometimes by vast amounts) monthly wages. Prize money offered lieutenants and midshipmen a comfortable, albeit modest, supplement to their pay while apprenticing for command, but what really mattered was what lay ahead if command were achieved. Prize money gave non-commissioned officers strong incentives to maintain ties to the Navy: Wages plus prize money exceeded anything they could hope for elsewhere, ashore or afloat. For seamen, prize money offered dreams of financial independence but for most the best they could realistically expect was an occasional debauch ashore. For the Navy—and thus the King—the prize system offered three attractions. By importantly supplementing the wages from the Exchequer, prize money directly reduced the costs of fighting the wars that dominated the age of sail. Moreover, when warships were captured rather than sunk, they could be added to the fleet—which hastened the buildup necessary to vanquish the King's enemies. But perhaps most importantly, by tying pay directly to performance and responsibility, the prize system offered officers and men at all ranks the incentive to act much as though they were the King Himself.

Using novel quantitative historical data on 2,483 British privateering cruises, we show that
state-licensed commerce raiding by merchants was not only a popular and profi…table business, but also effective in harming enemy trade during the long eighteenth century (1688-1815). Why, then, did privateering merchants gradually turn away from the enterprise, despite the success of this private provision of sea power? We provide systematic evidence that the expansion of overseas trade and ensuing decline in the pro…fitability of commerce raiding facilitated the decline of British privateering and the transition to a public provision of sea power by the Royal Navy by the end of the Napoleonic Wars.

The Second Bronze Age in China:
Why Were Earliest Chinese Cannons Made of Bronze?
English Abstract
In his brilliant study on the history of war technology, The Pursuit of Power, Wil-liam McNeill suggested that the development of cannons in the West went through a stage of “Second Bronze Age”, because wrought iron which was the mainstay of Western iron technology was not fit for manufacturing cannons, which undisputedly appeared for the first time in the West in around 1326. However, without cast iron technology, which was discovered perhaps by the late 14th century, but applied to casting cannons in around 1543, the West had to resort to using bronze. McNeill thus calls this brief reversion to the use of bronze “The Second Bronze Age”, approximately 1400-1543.
Interestingly, early specimens of Chinese cannons that date back to the turn of the fourteenth century were also made of bronze. Iron cannons did not make their debut until slightly later. What is significant is that what have remained of cast iron cannons are often badly broken, suggesting that cast iron cannons were defective, hardly capable of withstanding the explosive power.
If the Chinese iron technology had been characterized by cast iron technology, then it would be quite strange that they did not apply that technology to the fashioning of cannons, which were ready to appear towards the end of the Southern Song, after the first formula of gunpowder was recorded in around 1040. At the time gunpowder was used as a kind of slow match on battle field. But explosive quality of gunpowder was appreciated slightly later, during the wars between Song Chinese and the nomadic Jurchens in the middle of the 12th century. The knowledge and manipulation of explosion of gunpowder necessitated the use of hard metal and especially delivery barrels. Cast iron would in theory serve this purpose well.
However, the Song iron technology could not meet the needs. This is most likely a consequence of the use of coal (shitan), instead of charcoal, to smelt iron ore that became popular in the Northern Song times (960-1126). The use of coal to smelt iron ore requires a rather sophisticated technique that Northern Song artisans did not possess. Northern Chinese coal often contained excessively high percentage of sulfur. Cast ion that contains more than 0.5% of sulfur loses its hardness. Averagely speaking, North China coal today contains more than several percentage of sulfur. Without the skill to abstract sulfur and other impurities from coal, the Chinese artisans were not able to cast hard-enough cannon barrels that could reliably withstand the explosive power of gunpowder in use. This was why they had to revert back to using bronze.
The use of charcoal for smelting iron ore continued in the south, where good iron implements were much coveted as late as the seventeenth century. However, from the Song through the Ming (1368-1661), Chinese increasingly were using the so-called “shu-tie”, a kind of iron that is similar to traditional Western wrought iron, except that it came from processing cast iron, and hence was of better quality than wrought iron. However, shutie, like wrought iron, is not fit for manufacturing cannons.
It took the Europeans a couple of hundred years to completely master the cast iron technology; the invention of coke in 1704 is the decisive moment, when one could say that the European “Second Bronze Age” in cannon-making came full cycle. The Chinese had by 1599 developed the skill to extract coke, but for various reasons, and the increas-ing reliance on the shutie not the least prominent, they never seemed to have been able to produce good-quality cast iron cannons and actually abandoned manufacturing iron can-nons completely after the middle of the sixteenth century. The time was when Europeans, equipped with their iron, as well as bronze, cannons, were arriving China. Thus, the second Chinese Bronze Age ended in a way fundamentally different from that of Europe. The Chinese started their Second Bronze Age in bout the turn of the fourteenth century, and hence predated Europe for a century and a half. However, it never actually ended until the Europeans introduced their technique to China.
The comparative experiences of cannon-making and cast-iron technology show that no civilizations have to take the same route of development. Chinese artisans seemed to have been more fascinated with how to improve iron implements for daily use, and were satisfied without having to better the quality of cast iron that was essential for mak-ing cannons. On the other hand, Europeans seem to have more systematically wanted to manufacture weapons that represented power, notwithstanding economic irrationality. This last point echoes McNeill’s putative remark on Europeans’ “unintelligible behavior”. However, it was the Chinese rationality that led to its failure to comprehend the military implications of technological progress or regress.

This paper will explore the interconnection among warfare, state power and public debts by focusing on a case study of the military-fiscal government in twelfth-century Sichuan, an upper-Yangtze River Basin in Southwest China. Song China (960-1279) witnessed significant financial innovations, many of which should be attributed to the crucial connection between the commercialized warfare and the monetarized economy. The Song court was unusually enthusiastic in carrying out mercantile policies (esp. encouraging the developments in trade, transportation, mining and technology and providing protection to private merchants) because it had to secure money to maintain its standing armies, the largest number of professional troops (about 1.2 million at the full scale) in imperial China that were living on monthly payments. In the eleventh century the Song state was already a fiscal state, whose statehood was largely characterized by its effective control of the resources through markets and indirect taxation. About two-thirds of the Song revenues were collected from non-agricultural sectors, especially from monopolies of a few key consumption goods such as salt, tea and wine. Meanwhile the central government produced about 260 million strings of cash, the largest number of copper coins ever made in Chinese history, to facilitate the circulation of goods. The Song fiscal administration also came to know how to issue vouchers (also called salt/tea tickets) to merchants for the privilege in trading monopolized goods who, in order to acquire the vouchers, must first transfer military provision to the frontier in time of warfare. After they acquired the vouchers, they might sell them at the market to tea or salt merchants. Such practice, in fact, laid foundation for the emergence of a financial market in China; however, the statesmen were not ready to issue public debts even at the dawn of the twelfth century largely because the taxation in general could meet the demands from the military expenditures.
The rise of nomadic power in East and Central Asia, especially the Mongols, marked the twelfth century a most violent period in Chinese history, in which the Song dynasty enjoyed only 18 years of peace. The Song court lost its territory in the north and moved the capital to Hangzhou, a city in the Lower Yangtze Delta. South China’s geography was dominated by hills and rivers, which gave the Song defense a great advantage in carrying out siege wars in defense of the nomadic invasion: fortifications, engines, and projectile technology (even fire rockets), all these military innovations were applied to the campaigns. The extremely capital-intensive way in Song military defense forced the government, who was already puzzled by the budget deficit, to appeal to the financial market for help. In the last three decades before the Mongol conquered China, resistant wars in Sichuan provided an excellent example of how war makes the states and vice versa. In Sichuan more than half of the military expenditures were met by the issuance of jiaozi and chuanyin, a short-term certificate of public debts which were backed up by official profits from monopolies and by state reserves of precious metals. By 1178 the size of public debts increased to 45 millions strings, far exceeding what the Sichuan administration collected from taxes. The rapid expansion in public debts helped the government to mobilize resources effectively in time of wars and greatly increased the monetized portion of the Sichuan economy, one of more than 10 million residents in the twelfth century. This new military-fiscal pattern gave enormous strength to the Sichuan local administration in defense of the Mongol troops, which won a couple of campaigns and did not surrender until the other part of China was occupied by the Mongols.

The histories of capitalism as a socio-political production system, geographical expansion of the Western European states and economies, the emergence of world-wide geopolitics, and patterns of global warfare, have been inextricably linked since the late15th Century. All should be explained as components of an integrated system. Existing approaches to theorising and explaining this complex historical process have significant weaknesses, including, firstly, a lack of engagement across paradigmatic approaches to explaining world history. Secondly, in many approaches to the history of world political economy and geopolitics, the concepts of progress, teleology, eschatology have been central, to the detriment of explanation. Thirdly, a lack of systemic-evolutionary theorising has undermined attempts to build a framework of theorising that is adequate to the task. Fourthly, the rational choice paradigm has not been able to construct a viable general approach.

This paper outlines a tentative framework developed from a combination of historical understanding of the long-run interconnection between geopolitics and economics since the 15th century, a Darwinian-institutionalist evolutionary theory of long-run social change, and a non-teleological approach, which incorporates new socio-biological theory, to the role of warfare in social transformations in the past, present, and future. Warfare is both the catalyst and consequence of this process and a peaceful world cannot be constructed until, inter alia, these deep systemic roots of forms of global-capitalist warfare are comprehended.

The architecture that I propose to present draws heavily upon the British case. Between the first Anglo-Dutch War, l651 and l846 (which marks the end of the mercantilist international economic order and a conjuncture in Britains precocious industrialization) the offshore island was engaged in some 14 major and minor conflicts with rivals from the mainland and imperial warfare in India, China, Africa and the Americas. Connexions between this long sequence of warfare and economic growth will be analysed and elaborated under the following
explanatory headings:
1. Counterfactuals: wars as deviations from trends.
2. The mobilization of labour and the loss of human capital
3. Taxation allied to the accumulation of Government debt represented as the crowding out of a potential for higher rates of growth
4.. Expenditures on warfare that restrained or
accelerated structural change and technological innovation.
5. The rise of British naval hegemony, the gains from trade and the extension of a globalizing world economy,1805-1914
6. The British Industrial Revolution as the paradigmn case of successful mercantilism

During its period of expansion from the mid-17th to mid 18th century, the Qing empire conquered new territories containing abundant mineral, agricultural, and commercial resources. Its pattern and goals of military conquest resembled in some respects that of European colonial empires during the same period. Many writers have argued to the contrary that the Qing is not comparable to other colonial empires, because its primary goal was stability, not expansion and extraction of new resources. In this paper, I analyze several examples of Qing expansion, especially in the southern region of Yunnan, to reveal the important role of economic resources in Qing miitary policy making.

In 1800, the two Scandinavian realms – Denmark and Sweden – were ruled by absolute monarchs who claimed the right to reign without the interference of elected assemblies. Both states had ambitions to act on the international arena, but could not compete with the major Europeans powers such as Britain or France. They therefore had to develop strategies that would protect and promote their commercial and political interests in the Baltic region, but also further away in the Atlantic and in Asia, within an international power structure that was dominated and determined by the major European powers.

One crucial prerequisite for being able to act on the international arena was the capability to cover discrepancies between government spending and available revenue. Since war and preparing for war was so costly no government was able to finance the increase in spending with available revenue. It was difficult to increase taxes, especially for absolute monarchs who did not want to rely on elected assemblies. It therefore became essential to borrow the necessary resources from various sources. During the eighteenth century both Denmark and Sweden developed their borrowing capabilities on the domestic and international capital markets. They issued bonds that targeted local investors, but they also established ties with international financial centers such as Amsterdam and Genoa. Although the Danish and Swedish borrowing systems were not as effective as the British, the two countries managed to fund continuous deficits.

The existing economic and political order in Scandinavia became increasingly strained during the early nineteenth century following the drawn out worldwide conflict commonly known as the Napoleonic Wars. Even though both Denmark and Sweden actively tried to stay out of the conflict by pursuing a policy of neutrality, they slowly got drawn into the war. The war required mobilization of men and resources on a scale that had scarcely been seen before. The demand for resources put the existing revenue and borrowing systems under extreme pressure. Furthermore it affected the relationship between the ruling elite and the governed population. The war would also influence Denmark and Sweden in fundamental ways: Sweden lost Finland and Pomerania, the king was deposed, a new constitution adopted and a unilateral decision was made to cancel part of the country’s foreign debt, while Denmark defaulted on part of its debt and lost Norway. The Danish political system, however, survived the storm.

The tumultuous economic and political effects of the Napoleonic Wars on Scandinavia offer us an opportunity to explore the connections between war finance and political developments. In my paper I will examine the links between the ways the two countries financed their deficits and political change. What role did war finance play in the survival of the absolute monarchy in Denmark and in its downfall in Sweden? Another important aspect is what factors determined the ways the two Scandinavian states organized their borrowing. Was it internal factors such as existing economic and political institutions, or external circumstances such as the availability of international capital, that structured the two countries’ debt strategies?

Answering these questions can, besides shedding light on economic and political developments in Scandinavia, give us an insight into how states in the European periphery handled internal and external pressures, and an international state system that was dominated by the major European powers.

In the early 1990s, Jan de Vries launched his concept of the ‘industrious revolution’ to explain the economic changes preceding the Industrial Revolution. From the mid-seventeenth century onwards, households supposedly chose to re-allocate their time and labour power in order to expand their consumptive possibilities. This household-based resource allocation increased the supply of market goods as well as the demand for marketed commodities, thus laying the foundation for economic growth in the period before industrialization. One important means to reach this goal, was mobilizing (married) women and children as wage labourers, according to De Vries.
The concept of the Industrious Revolution has set women’s and children’s work, previously often considered as ‘supplementary’ or ‘additional’, on the agenda as a vital factor in explaining economic development; it shows the explanatory power of the integration of gender in economic history and it offers possibilities to view historical agents as players on that market, making their own choices within given boundaries and therewith determining certain trends in market developments.
However, as it is not actually explained why this appears as an important incentive in the seventeenth century, consumption appears as a ‘Deus ex machina’. The central assumption that the labour participation of women and children increased lacks a solid empirical basis for most of the period - the data on increased female labour market participation almost all derived from the 19th century. Furthermore, the assumption that an increased wish for changing consumption patterns already existed among wage earning households in the early modern period is not really substantiated. It is not clear if the same households who started to intensify their labour, also changed or augmented their consumption patterns.
This paper will systematically address these points, substantiated with data from our own research on women’s and children’s work in the Dutch Republic. In the end, we will hope to be able to give a nuanced view of the advantages and the limitations of using the industrious revolution as a conceptual tool for women’s and children’s work.

Children were important in the households of the “industrious revolution”. They stood alongside mothers on the margins of the household and the economy, and as these margins shifted in response to cycles in consumption, leisure, and home production on the one hand and waged work on the other, likely became involved. Thus, De Vries suggests that children as well as married women were key actors in the 18th century reallocation of labour time to waged work to finance the consumption of novel early-modern commodities. However, historians have shown more interest in the production and consumption of married women. Cynical readers might conclude that while women are all too easily cast as fervid consumers, children resist such assignment. Similarly, in the breadwinner-homemaker cycle of the 19th century, De Vries argues that children’s labour remained important, substituting for the efforts of mothers. Here he is at odds with histories of child labour, which date the “adulting” of the labour force from mid-century and depict “the schooled child” as a key element in working-class respectability (Cunningham, 2000).

This paper proposes to investigate the contribution of children to 18th century industriousness and to the subsequent appearance of the male-breadwinner family. In particular, it asks whether children were motivated to work by the desire for consumption goods, and if so whether these were of the same type as those, which purportedly moved their parents. It also asks whether the sacrificed alternatives were leisure and home production or investment in human capital. If children substituted waged work for schooling or training, this has implications for developments in literacy and heights, as well as for the productivity of the next generation of adult workers. Finally, it explores the forces that retained children in the male-breadwinner households of the mid-19th century, and particularly whether, as De Vries contends, it was their increasing appreciation for social products like cleanliness and hygiene, exclusive to households with a homemaker mother, that preserved their loyalty. The investigation makes use of a large body of material extracted from working-class memoirs of the period presented in detail in Humphries (2009). It uses both quantitative and qualitative evidence to begin to answer these research questions.

In the early 1990s, Jan de Vries launched his concept of the ‘industrious revolution’ to explain the economic changes preceding the Industrial Revolution. From the mid-seventeenth century onwards, households supposedly chose to re-allocate their time and labour power in order to expand their consumptive possibilities. This household-based resource allocation increased the supply of market goods as well as the demand for marketed commodities, thus laying the foundation for economic growth in the period before industrialization. One important means to reach this goal, was mobilizing (married) women and children as wage labourers, according to De Vries.
The concept of the Industrious Revolution has set women’s and children’s work, previously often considered as ‘supplementary’ or ‘additional’, on the agenda as a vital factor in explaining economic development; it shows the explanatory power of the integration of gender in economic history and it offers possibilities to view historical agents as players on that market, making their own choices within given boundaries and therewith determining certain trends in market developments.
However, as it is not actually explained why this appears as an important incentive in the seventeenth century, consumption appears as a ‘Deus ex machina’. The central assumption that the labour participation of women and children increased lacks a solid empirical basis for most of the period - the data on increased female labour market participation almost all derived from the 19th century. Furthermore, the assumption that an increased wish for changing consumption patterns already existed among wage earning households in the early modern period is not really substantiated. It is not clear if the same households who started to intensify their labour, also changed or augmented their consumption patterns.
This paper will systematically address these points, substantiated with data from our own research on women’s and children’s work in the Dutch Republic. In the end, we will hope to be able to give a nuanced view of the advantages and the limitations of using the industrious revolution as a conceptual tool for women’s and children’s work.

This paper discusses Jan De Vries's concept "industrious revolution" historiographically. It then proceeds to confront the concept with what we know about changes in time use in (mainly) early modern Sweden. A case is being made for the importance of access to land: if land is widely available in society, the industrious revolution may have other effects than what is usually assumed. An industrious revolution can also be triggered by other things than a change in consumer preferences, for instance, by tax demands.

Jan de Vries has famously located an "Industrious Revolution" in the years 1650-1800 in countries such as England and the Netherlands. While undoubtedly a transition occurred at some point before the Industrial Revolution from leisure loving to goods loving societies, the argument here is that this transition was much more gradual than has been proposed. Many of the features cited in favor of a sudden Industrious Revolution in these years can instead be explained in terms of supply, rather than from demand as in the de Vries formulation.

This paper is a first investigation into the unexplored field of child labour history in the countryside of the Southern Netherlands. Although Belgium was one of the first continental nations to industrialize, the historical roots of the child labour force have not been researched in detail. In this paper some possible avenues of research and sources are highlighted. A preliminary study of sources and literature indicates that children - as the concept of Jan de Vries' Industrious Revolution implies- became increasingly involved in market-oriented household production. Whilst the household economy might have benefitted from the increasing labour supply of children, the exchange between the children and the household economy turned out to be unequal. When inter-generational transfers are considered, the children of the industrious revolution did not benefit from the rise in living standards.

Bangladesh is a unique land for studying the role of native women in expanding the world capitalism. The British ruled in the Indian sub-continent for about two hundred years as a colonial ruler shattered the unchanging self-sufficient Indian village economy by incorporating it into the world capitalist system in terms of introducing private ownership in land, and developing various capitalist organizations. Hence, the newly created capitalist organizations pulled in a large number of newly created poverty trapped Indian women, previously most of who engaged in maintaining domestic affairs such as cooking daily family meals, taking care of children, elderly members and cattle, helping their peasant husbands by collecting, processing and preserving crops during harvesting. Some of them also provided domestic labour to the relatively affluent rural people in exchange of goods and foods rather than money. In a broad sense, before the colonial rules in India, the role of the rural Indian women, like their men counterparts, was mainly limited to sustaining the traditional subsistence economy. Because of colonial exploitations, rural poverty emerged and the traditional Indian women had to immerse themselves into the modern capitalist organizations, and assumed the role of wage laborers. Hence, the early capitalist industries in India such as the cotton mills in Bombay, tea plants in Calcutta and Assam, and the coalmines in West Bengal were all full of women workers leaving their traditional roles. These women were forced to assume the role of wage labourer although the colonial bourgeoisies deprived the native women from minimum wages, standard working hours and decent working conditions, compared to European and or the world standard. Hence, unlike the thesis of De Vries developed in the context of Europe, Indian women were neither mobilized by themselves nor by the indigenous socio-economic conditions rather by the exploitative British colonial regimes in India for their own interests during the 19th century. Thus, a major proportion of profit earned from India by the colonial rulers was provided by the Indian women workers on the one hand while, indirectly, the sustainability of British Industries located in Manchester, Dundee and Lancashire was largely depended on such exploited laborers as the British industries depended on Indian raw materials. Interestingly, after sixty-one years of the abolition of colonial rule in India prosperity of world capitalism and large Transnational Corporations in the era of neo-liberal globalization also largely depend on the exploitations of Bangladeshi women working in the export oriented Readymade Garment Industry and providing the clothing needs of the large sweatshop companies. Hence, this paper is an attempt to reveal a contrast pattern, way and intention of mobilizing women labour force in Bangladesh by the world capitalists, not arguing against the work of De Vries that was developed in a different context. Using historical and secondary literature and documents, the focus of the paper is on the necessity of exploiting the women labour in third world countries like Bangladesh for the development of world capitalism, of economy and of the consumptions of the capitalist countries during different historical junctures of capitalism such as colonialism and neo-colonialism. In both the periods, the mobilization of native women labourers is a prey of capitalist exploitations that deny the minimum rights of the women for the sake of the interests of the world capitalists.

In his 2008 book, Jan de Vries sets out his interpretation of the rise of the male breadwinner household in the nineteenth century: that an increasing number of labouring families valued household time spent by the wives to produce the desired forms of Z-goods that would have been unattainable via their market income. This paper examines one important implication of this argument that such household production time had been sacrificed during the period of growing industriousness, by making use of a small set of micro-data for farm households in interwar Japan, where the era of growing industriousness was approaching the final stage. A multivariate analysis of married women’s time use data has been conducted by controlling for alternating stages of the stem family life cycle of the Japanese household. The results will reveal that the elasticity of their working time in agriculture with respect to their husbands’ working hours was close to 1, while the elasticity of their time devoted to domestic tasks with respect to their husbands’ working hours was negative and close to -0.5, suggesting that married women did sacrifice time to be devoted to domestic duties in the period of growing industriousness, and that as long as labour intensity in agriculture increased over time, the total hours actually worked by Japanese farm women tended to increase over the long-run.

Evidence from Spain suggests an increasing attachment of the population to the labor force during the 18th century. Working harder, decreasing leisure, vagrancy, and seasonal underemployment were among the consistent proposals of 18th century reformers; there is in fact an abundance of normative and legislative texts that can be used as sources to document this trend. In accordance to De Vries' theory, evidence also suggests that women, and male and female children, were the main objectives of this new mobilization.

The paper has three parts: the first analyzes the evidence on women’s increasing participation in the labor force and to what extent an 'industrious revolution' existed in 18th century Spain. The second discusses the reasons for this change: (a) on the demand side, women's much lower wages accounted for their increasing employment. In a context of a widening trade deficit due to a large extent to luxury imports, and with Spain trying not to be left behind in the new manufacture revolution taking place in the Low Countries, England and France, low labor costs appeared as most convenient for agriculture, manufactures and services; (b) on the supply side, it was not, as was the case in the Low Countries, the drive to new consumption goods that led people to work harder; post mortem inventories show that a massive access to new goods did not occur. Rather, increasing fiscal pressure and increasing agricultural rents were the factors to account for people's more intense attachment to the labor force. This explains why they worked harder, but still remained poor. The final part of the paper discusses men’s and women’s access to economic and social resources, within and outside the family, to explain why women had less access than men to the new consumption goods.

If the larger aim of this session is to detail the role of women and children in the Industrious Revolution, my endeavour through this research paper is to, first and foremost, find out if there was an industrious revolution in the Indian context. The concept of de-industrialization is one that comes foremost in mind when one thinks of the economic history of the region. Thus, assuming that a process of industrialization was well on its way, before the clogs of colonization jammed the wheels, one can hope that the sources will give a researcher certain material to enquire if traces of Industrious Revolution, as proposed and defined by Jan de Vries, can be found in the context of the Indian sub-continent.
From existing literature one can attempt a region specific study based on the textile workers of the Coromandel Coast. Through such a case based study, one hopes, one will be able to bring forward concrete factual data about the changing productive and consumptive patterns in the era before industrialization, changes in the allocation of labour within families, or on changes in the consumptive behaviour of household, especially with the beginning of commercial exploitation of the textile workers by Europeans on the Coromandel Coast. One can further hope to enquire if the European East Indian Companies, English and Dutch, benefit or be a catalyst for an Industrious Revolution by increasing the demand for Coromandel textile? This paper will therefore aim to answer if there was an Industrious Revolution in the Indian subcontinent. It will outline the sources available for such a study and the shortcomings that will have to be overcome if one wants to further enquire if women’s and children’s work contributed to the industrious revolution in the sub-continent.
The paper will then further attempt to evaluate as to the extent to which the concept of Industrious Revolution is a valuable one for theorizing about changing patterns in women’s and children’s work in the Indian context.

It is conventionally assumed ― implicitly or explicitly ― that the working year in premodern England was largely fixed and that consumption varied with changes in wages or prices. This view is challenged by the twin theories of the consumer revolution and the industrious revolution, positing an increase in the number of days worked per year as people earned surplus money to buy novel consumer goods. To shed light on the matter, we assume that workers acted to stabilize consumption over time and compute how much the working year had to change in order to achieve that. By comparison with independent estimates, we find no obvious signs of a consumer revolution among farm labourers; their labour supply curve was largely backward‐bending and their ‘industrious revolutions’ imputable chiefly to economic hardship. Urban building workers, on the other hand, did not suffer severely from economic hardship and had great scope for a consumer revolution.

In research recent on branding, the guilds’ trademarks have been identified as ‘the earliest signs of branding’, the aim of which was to protect both craftspeople and consumers against inferior quality. Yet in juridical terms, modern trade marks and brands are seen as a type of intellectual property of firms – without a relation being established with either the quality of the product concerned or the skills of the manufacturers. The guilds’ trade marks, in contrast, did not only convey messages on the image and reputation of the product but on the status and reputation of the different agents involved in the products’ path from production to distribution as well. This becomes apparent when analyzing the evaluation of who was entitled to use specific marks and how, if at all, they were related to product quality? Who managed and monitored commodity ‘branding’ and how did this affect the cultural identity created?
In this paper, I will address these questions for branding practices in the context of late medieval and early modern craft guilds. For while most scholars seem to agree on the dual function of brands – as bearers of information on the one hand and ‘charismatic signifiers’ of (product) identity on the other – , the question of the ‘agency’ concerning the act of sealing and ‘branding’ (and the related political dimension) is crucial to understand the general meaning of branding in any historical context. In the first section, I will shortly overview the possible links between branding and guilds as they are mentioned in some recent literature. Secondly, the guilds’ use of trade marks will be analyzed in detail for one cluster of crafts in particular: the manufacturing and sale of tableware (notably silver, tin and earthenware). In the third section I will situate these practices in the wider representational strategies of the guilds, linking them to a set of new theoretical frames: Bruno Latour’s ‘making things public’ and the so-called ‘theories of convention’. In the fourth and final section ‘branding’ will be examined for a sector in which collective marks were as a rule absent (although manufacturers could be organized in guilds): earthenware. In this sector trade marks were bound to persons and could thus move from one location to another or from one firm to another. Comparing this with the guilds’ trade marks, I will formulate some hypothesis regarding the evolution from (guild-based) trade marks towards moderns ‘brands’ used by individual firms. The aim is to shed light on the shifts towards modern branding at the end of the ancien régime, which resulted, among other things, in the abolition of the guilds.

I would propose facing this theme through the analysis of a concrete object: a logo of the 18th century, in relation to the production of silk veils in Switzerland. The picture (Figure1) offers us various interpretative viewpoints that highlight specific aspects of this case, along with other more general features.

In the city of Münster, one of the central places in Westphalia for trading linen, the branding of linen started around 1458. The city council established a new organization, the "Legge", where linen was certified as being conform to the quality requirements of the city of Münster. Originating from the country side the linen was only qualified as originating from Münster but not as a product being produced in the city itself. This practice can be considered as a form of branding. The linen was sold on several European export markets in rolls, which were traded as a branded good that had to conform to certain standards of quality. The attempts of the city council for improving the practices of inspection give insights into the practices of constituting and maintaining a brand. This kind of linen was not only traded as a brand of the city Münster, but also of nearby Osnabrück, which was the more important place and brand of origin on textile markets abroad. These practices of different brands for one specific product quality and of copying quality standards will be discussed. In early 17th century a group of weavers in Münster specialized on the production of a certain quality of linen and different practices of certification were established. Conflicts about the labelling of linen give insights into the strategies of artisans to create brands for textile markets. The branding of these linens originating from urban production will be discussed in comparison to the already established practices.

In the last decades of the 19th century the trademark took on relevance both as an instrument of information regarding the existence of new goods – thus advertising innovative products but also the company that produced them - and as a way to identify or differentiate goods that had become, with the progressive emergence of mass production, increasingly similar and otherwise difficult to distinguish. Indeed, the improvements in transport and communication of the second half of the 19th century deeply modified the economic geography of regional and national markets offering hitherto unknown opportunities in the commercialisation of goods. As a consequence, business and consumer habits also changed. Goods no longer travelled accompanied by the merchant, who was in general a familiar and trusted person, but circulated within an impersonal commercial system. In their turn, consumers began to familiarize with the large-scale distribution that decisively contributed to the modernisation of consumer models.

As far as fashion goods are concerned, it can be said that within such a dynamic commercial framework trademarks assumed the specific function - tightly connected with the specific nature of goods the value of which is dependent of the reputation given them by the trend setters, i.e. at that time the fashionable French society - of allowing the consumer to identify the fashion product at first sight and to recognize it much more easily than if she had to recognize the good itself.

The research is based on the registers of trademarks deposited in Milan's Chamber of Commerce in the period 1869-1914. The dataset we have built will be described and analyzed respectively from a quantitative and chronological perspective in the first part of the paper. In the second one we focus on brands registered in the textile and clothing category to put forward some hypothesis concerning the structure of the fashion industry in Milan, which in those years was emerging as a leading city of the Italian economic and industrial development. Finally, a closer look at some specific kinds of goods and firms provides further evidence on the modernization of fashion production and consumption of a late-comer fashion capital, as Milan can be considered. The comparison is made with Paris which had the leadership in matters of taste, quality of fabrics and innovations in dress styling not only in Europe, but also in the USA where the Parisian couturiers were well known as they had already begun to export their most fashionable creations.

The marked and constant increase of the trade in counterfeit products makes counterfeiting an economic problem of international magnitude (Grossman and Shapiro 1988; Trott and Hoecht 2007) and led to a variety of countermeasures based on lawful, political, administrative or business techniques. With regard to the number of cases of counterfeit goods seized by customs, in 2007 in the EU, there has been a significant increase of 17% compared to last year (EU, 2007). In 2007, in almost all sectors customs have intervened in more cases than the previous year, with an important role played by the luxury clothing and accessories (in particular leather goods and footwear) sector . According to the World Customs Organisation (WCO) counterfeiting account about 7-10 percent of global commerce.
This gives rise to the necessity to investigate thoroughly this, until now somewhat neglected, phenomenon. The development of appropriate strategies and measures for combating counterfeiting must, in fact, take in consideration a general understanding of the phenomenon and in particular of its evolution. Through an historical analysis, within the handbag industry, of the two most counterfeited luxury brands (Louis Vuitton and Gucci), and a multidisciplinary approach, this paper tries to identify a) the market evolutions and b) the competitive dynamics within the industry, that have favoured the development of the counterfeit phenomenon in recent years. Considering the market evolutions, special attention has been paid to the gradual affirmation of the strong relationship between brands and individual/social identity (among others, Ahuvia, 2005; Belk, 1988; De Vries 2008). The construction of one’s self and social referencing become gradually central in the brand consumption. In particular, in contemporary consumer culture, people use luxury brands’ symbolic meanings (for example, uniqueness, exclusivity, prestige, etc.) to enhance their self-concept and to fulfil their desire to conform to affluent lifestyle and/or to be distinguished from non-affluent ones. However, together with the desire for luxury brands, several constraints can be present that disable individuals to purchase them; in these cases to use a fake luxury brand accessible to them that looks like the original can be considered an acceptable compromise, although some rules must be followed (Gistri et al., forthcoming).
Considering on the other side the competitive dynamics within the industry, the historical analysis could give the opportunity to identify, from the supply point of view, the main factors responsible for the diffusion of counterfeiting. In this context, a special attention has been given to a) the evolution of product lines (in terms of design, materials used, etc.); b) the development of production system and the role played by suppliers (normally direct suppliers and sub-suppliers); c) the changes over time in the distribution systems and advertising campaigns in order to attract new groups of consumers.

This study aims to analyse the success of Campari, one of the most interesting companies producing goods for mass consumption in Italy. This brand became not only a business success, but also a symbol of the Italian industrialization.
The Campari company was born in Milan at the end of XIX century and it became a business success when Davide Campari, the son of the founder, foresaw the arrival of a new life style in the industrial society and started to promote Bitter Campari, the alcoholic beverage created by his father, with a innovative marketing policy.
The specific attention to the consumer drove the company to develop international business. To achieve this aim the company registered its trademark in every part of the world where there were Italian communities that consumed “made in Italy” products. Success also brought counterfeiting.
This study concentrates on two specific issues:
a) a series of lawsuits by Campari in Geneve during 1920s
b) imitators and counterfeiters in Italy in the same period.
From these points emerges the importance of the brand in the success of a business. It is also important to underline the complex relationship between the successful company and its stakeholders.

This paper examines the invention of manufacturers’ brands as a commercial technique. In 2001, John Styles argued that branded goods emerged first in seventeenth-century London. In particular, he identified a cluster of proprietary medicines as being the first goods with manufacturer’s brands, rather than the generic brands created by guilds and cities. This paper seeks to examine in greater depth the process by which branding came to be used by the producers of proprietary medicines. While Styles’ priority claim appears to stand, at least in an English context, the process by which branding emerged was somewhat different to that which he describes. Drawing on a new survey of the proprietary medicine sector, I suggest that brands developed through a slow, patchy and provisional process. Brands drew heavily on a number of pre-existing techniques and concepts, while the key devices through which they were articulated – print advertising and packaging – were controversial and were adopted slowly and often provisionally. While branding was gradually recognised as a way to allow producers to achieve new economies in distribution, much of the initial process of innovation was driven by the problem of overcoming highly insecure property rights. The history of the fake and the brand were intertwined from the very beginning, with competition from counterfeiters being the key force driving brand innovation.

In early modern times, wine was already a differentiated product, an “experience good” characterized by a high degree of quality uncertainty. In order to reduce this uncertainty, merchants and consumers in the United Provinces would rely on various mechanisms to coordinate their transactions, such as networks, reputation, brokers’ expertise, certificates of origin and auctions.
In the middle of the eighteenth century, the combined influences of fiscal reform, the impoverishment of the middle classes, the drop in prices of colonial drinks and changes in taste considerably modified the Dutch wine market. The volume of imports declined and elite consumer preferences shifted from relatively cheap white to more complex and costly red wines. At the same time, a large-scale Dutch « wine » industry was born. Contemporary observers mention extensive plantations producing cheap ersatz, based on various fruits and wine lee. In this context of growing contrasts, producer brands started to play an increasing role as a coordination regime in Dutch wine trade.
Using essentially merchant correspondence and the reports of the Amsterdam wine auctions, I will analyse what use Dutch wholesale merchants made of producer brands. A number of related questions will be addressed. What was the advantage of producer brands as compared to other coordination mechanisms for certifying quality? Did merchants promote these brands to try to bind their customers or to create barriers to market entry? Would merchants advertise brands to enhance their own prestige? What was the identity of the first merchants who mentioned producer brands in their ads for public sales? Did they take the initiative to advertise these brands themselves or did they act by order of their French principals? And which wines were concerned?
For lack of trade mark law and specific legal provisions, the respect of the identity and the integrity of producer brands remained difficult to enforce during the 18th century. However, customary procedures based on the elementary legal principals of “just price” and “good faith” offered a basic protection against excrescences.
Interestingly, in the long term producer brands seem to have contributed to capitalists’ participation in wine trade. From the 1760’s onward, the specialized huguenot merchants who had traditionally dominated Dutch wine imports using their extensive family and personal networks in France were progressively cast out of the market, whereas a number of substantial generalist wholesale merchants who totally lacked specific oenological knowledge and blindly relied on brand names took control of the upper segment of the market.

Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations.

The aim of this paper is to explain the incidence of the constitution of the land ownership systems on the income distribution and economic growth of settler economies (Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay) during the First Globalization. Considering a conceptual framework that combines the contributions of the New Institutional Economic Theory with Neo-ricardian models tradition, we describe the process of the distribution of the land property rights in historical perspective, analyze the characteristics of the land tenure system in a comparative perspective and estimate the factorial income distribution in the agriculture activity. We demonstrate that the land rent absorbed a much larger part of total output in River Plate countries than Australasia. This represented a negative incentive to productivity growth that contribute to explain the relative failure of Argentina and Uruguay compared to Australasian countries.

London’s eighteenth-century expansion required the reorganization of rights for large tracts of land. This property previously lay within equitable estates and agricultural villages. Removing property from these restrictive property-rights regimes proved problematic. Parliament catalyzed the process by passing acts reorganizing rights to land and resources. Two theories characterize Parliament’s behavior during this period. The first views Parliament as an organization that limited access to acts in order to earn rents for legislators or to advance the interests of aristocrats. The second views Parliament as an accessible institution that addressed issues brought before it by broad segments of society. We test these theories using time-series statistical methods and annual data on the number of acts passed by Parliament and the property market in Middlesex, the county surrounding London. The results are consistent with the conjecture of an accessible legislature.

The Great Divergence in standards of living for populations around the world occurred in the late 18th century. Prior to that date evidence suggests that real wages of most Europeans, many living in China and India were similar. Some a little higher and some a little lower but with a low dispersion. By the middle of the 19th century, a divergence had occurred with western Europe pulling away from other groups. Little is known about the standards of living of the aboriginal peoples of North America many of whom were primarily hunter/gatherer’s at the end of the 18th century.
Based on comparisons of expenditure, we show that the standard of living of aboriginal people in 1740 was similar to that of wage workers in London. However, within the next century, there would be a great divergence. This paper explores the ways in which hunter-gatherer lifeways and the concomitant property rights structures reduced the likelihood that native economy could experience modern rates of economic growth. Native society and property rights structures which provided a relatively high standard of living in the mid eighteenth century and for part of the nineteenth was unable to provide avenues for further development.

This paper explores the role of the Aragonese Crown in first creating, and later abrogating, the legal framework which made it possible for middle-class (non-noble) families to accumulate wealth. During the fourteenth century in particular, the Crown's initiatives ushered in a golden age of accumulation in many Catalan towns, which would later languish under re-feudalized conditions until the end of the ancien regime.

TBA

Focusing on administrative reform in 19th century Japan, the paper argues, that political centralization might facilitate institutional development by removing assymetries of information between local government officials at the periphery and their superiors in the capital. Estimating various econometric models of regional capital markets, the study finds, that late centralization went along with higher loan interest rates and arguably inferior institutions

Succeesful late development is dependent on an institutional framework which is conducive to growth. However, the state is only able to implement a growth conducive institutional framework if he introduces a civil service which works efficiently, is loyal and widely uncorrupt. In 18th century Germany this was not the case. State officials are reported to be corrupt and to work inefficiently. Additionally, sources show differences in the behavior of different groups of state officials. This paper argues that these differences were due to different income levels in 18th century civil service. Furthermore, the paper argues that civil service reforms at the beginning of the 19th century implemented rule of law not because of increases in income but due to an increase in loyalty and control of civil servants.

As Canada's Prairie Indians were driven onto reserves in the late 19th Century, their old hunting and gathering lifestyle disappeared, along with the bison. Indians and the Government desired the obvious substitute, settled agriculture, but Indian farming was not a success. Until about 1900, though, both Indians and immigrant settlers fared poorly, so the Indian failure does not tell the full story. Like the settlers, Indians faced difficult climatic conditions and undeveloped technology. Indian farmers however faced additional constraints imposed by the antagonistic attitude of some members of the Department of Indian Affairs, and by the complicated structure of property rights on reserves. After 1900, climate, technology and the worst of the obstruction of the Department of Indian Affairs were overcome, so the remaining problem was primarily that of property rights. Both settler and Indian farming progressed, though Indians never developed to the extent that they could compete in the market, and most were not even self-sufficient.

Historians have traditionally viewed the 1778 passage of Free Trade as a victory for Spanish commerce, a cause of major commercial growth. Coupled with this image was the notion that the traditional merchants of the Consulado were privileged rentiers who had long contributed to Spain's stagnation by excluding competition. Free Trade, then, destroyed their "monopoly" and ushered in a "golden era" of Spanish commerce. This paper challenges this argument on several grounds: 1) recent research has called into question the magnitude of post-reform commercial expansion; and 2) the era of freer trade saw a significant rise in commercial bankruptcies, even before the 1793 outbreak of war. In short, the era from 1778 to 1793 was not an era of commercial prosperity. The paper concludes that trade after 1778 entailed much greater riskiness due to the Bourbon Reforms having dismantled economic institutions that had long minimized risk. The consequence was economic crisis.

This paper is a modest contribution to our understanding of the Bourbon reforms in Mexico and the Spanish empire. The historiography on the reforms often place emphasis on administrative efficiency, improved tax collection and overseas trade, while domestic markets receive less attention (with the exception of the abolition of the repartimiento de mercancías). In this paper I ask whether the most "domestic" of all markets, grain markets, were also touched by Bourbon bureaucrats in the colonies. In particular I inquire on the application the Real Pragmática (Royal Order) of Free Grain Trade, issued by Charles III in 1765, in Mexico.
I argue that, while it was not published or divulgated as in Spain, it set precedent in cases heard in the Real Audiencia, and that it informed discussions on grain trade. It had little influence on matters of retail trade, in part because Mexico did not have the extensive price controls in place in Spain. Yet, it had an impact on the regulation of wholesale grain trade. Moreover, the viceroy took a more hands-on approach on mediating inter-jurisdictional conflicts on grain trade—a position that stemmed from the provisions of the Real Pragmática. The direction of the change in policies involved a centralization of power and pragmatism, more than a consistent support for free trade policies.

ABSTRACT

Cuba played a basic rôle in the Spanish Tobacco Monopoly. The inauguration of the second Factoría in 1760 produced a complete change in the tobacco policies in Latin America, in line with other modifications in taxes which were designed to raise more income, to cover the costs of defending the properties overseas. In this article, we give a basic analysis of the data available with respect to tobacco exports from Cuba to allow for a better contextualisation of the influence of the English-Spanish conflicts in the tobacco trade.


KEY WORDS

War and tobacco, tobacco, the history of Cuba, monopoly, political economy, trade and commerce in the 18th century

The Southeast of Brazil has an income level that approaches a mid level OECD country while the Northeast has an income comparable to Sub Saharan Africa. How did this happen? We know that it developed during the XIX century, as before that the Northeast, the first large sugar export region in the colony, responsible for up to 80% of world sugar production by the end of the XVI century, was the richest region. We postulate that the emergence of the income gap is even more localized in time and can be traced to the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the massive inflow of slaves that followed.

According to O’Rourke, 2006, the years from 1793 to 1815 saw an unusually bloody, lengthy and widespread conflict between Great Britain and France, which widened to include many of the other leading powers of the day. The objective of this project is to offer a quantitative assessment of the economic impact of the conflict in a very specific region, the Port of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. The reason for such a choice is that this region, due to data availability, offers a unique opportunity to test not only the direct effects of the conflict on relative prices, as O’Rourke 2006 has done, with some detail for the USA, France and Britain, but also to test the influence of slavery on economic development as this region during the conflict became the largest slave port in the world. Shortly afterwards, with the port as the capital of the Portuguese empire due to the flight of the Portuguese Royal Family following Napoleon’s invasion of Iberia in 1807, Rio de Janeiro (and the Brazilian southeast in general) turned into the most dynamic region in Brazil, opening an income gap between it and the old Northeast sugar export zones that lasts to this day.

Given the data at hand we will also discuss a local version of the famous Eric William’s thesis from Capitalism and Slavery, where he asserts that the slave trade was fundamental to the launch of the British Industrial Revolution. Although there is enough evidence now to reject this hypothesis for Britain, because the size of the slave trade was comparatively small to have mattered, the same is not true for Brazil. We claim that the slave trade allowed Brazil to become the largest coffee exporter in the world, by the end of the XIX century one of the early industrializers in Latin America and currently one the 10 largest economies in the world. So, contrary to O’Rourke, 2006, the Napoleonic Wars were not a disruptive event for this region, but one the defining moments in the economic history of Brazil.

Cuban tobacco was the fundamental raw material to support the Spanish Tobacco Monopoly. The commercial tobacco flows between Havana and Cádiz-Sevilla, assured the means to canceled debts to the Treasury and supported part of the cost of the Army. This paper examines the role of the wars on the colonial trade between 1779 and 1817, an the consequences on the tobacco trade and its economy. the research is based on a general approach to the different informs and series of the official consumptions and incomes in Spain, as well as Cuba. The results shows: 1) the growth of tobacco's stocks in the Cuban factory; 2) the permanent tendency towards the fraudulent trade in Spain; 3) the willingness to modify the Spanish institutional framework; 4) the positive attitude towards the sugar in Cuba, as the market was not under e monopoly system as the tobacco was

Treats the 18th-century 'discovery' of Colombian platinum by European scientists and its relationship to colonial power relations and life in the placer mines of the Pacific lowlands.

During the eighteenth century, the growth of interactions among Atlantic commercial centers was based on agents who represented trade networks. These networks covered large distances connecting different continents within and beyond the limits of one single empire. Based on a sample of 2.100 proxy records obtained from the National Archive of Torre do Tombo (Lisbon), and on administrative and private papers documenting trans-imperial trade involving the Spanish and Portuguese empires, we were able to identify three types of networks considering the level of interaction of the agents involved. First, trans-imperial networks encompass agents who possessed enduring connections in different empires, i.e. a merchant house located in Lisbon with business with British and/or Spanish merchants. A trans-imperial network itself can be divided further into the extra-imperial network, which operates outside the empire, and the intra-imperial network, which operates within the empire linking commercial centers to the countryside. This paper offers a working model of these three dimensions of networks based on legal and illegal trade from the eighteenth-century empires of the Atlantic world that transcend state centered and nationalistic approaches. We argue that the use of these concepts in examining trade and social networks helps to integrate micro and macro historical processes, thereby providing a more comprehensive approach to understanding the interactions between the empires of the Atlantic and the relationships that came to form the region.

Recognizing the inextricable connection between local development and imperial wealth, the first Brazilian “industrial policy” emerged from this shift of Portuguese perspective. Studying this effort to develop an industrial proto-policy, this paper orients the intersection of local economic development in the colonies within global ambitions by examining the Portuguese Crown’s efforts to revitalize mining and to establish an iron forging industry of commercial scope. The industrial policy invoked two new strategies, with important institutional implications, in order to promote the resurgence of mining. Legal innovations targeted increasing mineral production by developing and protecting business partnership structures for mining companies. Ultimately, the policies were neither successful nor sustained, but they anticipated ideological debate and economic problems that re-emerged in the twentieth century.

In the field of economic history, few studies have examined how people use scattered, localized and dispersed information. This paper discusses approaches to a variety of historical markets in terms of information-asymmetry and examines whether a new interpretation of the market economy in China can be presented.
Information is one of the goods for users/buyers who have difficult ascertaining quality in advance. Devices or institutions are necessary to certify its quality prior to the transaction, and trust in the providers/sellers of information is one of the most important momentums. The paper explores the kebang network of Chinese merchants as such a device. It also discusses intermediates as being appreciated because of their role of reducing the asymmetry of information between two parties, although they only gave guarantees to the orders of a particular place or sphere. The production of information was active in Chinese economy. The elaborated intermediary system and its great presence within the overall institutional arrangement in late Imperial and modern China was the other side of the coin of people’s strong orientation toward market participation. People were keen to be less informed in the markets and they were well aware of the importance of knowledge.
Based on the recent transformation from the perfect market model with complete information into that of incompleteness, the studies of the historical market in China might contribute to the development of market model in theory.

In China, the early development of a market economy can be observed, while an identifiable cultural characteristic paralleled this development for more than ten centuries. Few studies, however, have undertaken overall analyses of the economy and culture for societies such as late imperial and republican China.
We start our arguments with one of the shared beliefs in Chinese society: a shared belief of living in a society involving severe/fierce competition among separate individuals. Land transactions, occupational choices, and employment agreements generally came to be based on contracts in the private sphere. Peasants had more opportunities to choose the marketplace at which and to whom they sold their products.
On the other hand, there were some distinctive features of Chinese markets compared with those of the “modern market” model, including personal, not anonymous, networks, an elaborated intermediary system, and indifference of Chinese state in providing formal institutions to maintain market order. How was the market order maintained under these circumstances?
In the field of economic theory, there are two profound changes in the views on the market model: one is the acknowledgement of the importance of private order governance to support the workings of market transactions; the other change involves a shift from the conventional model of perfect market to a market model of incompleteness and asymmetry of information. The historical market of China coincides more closely with the transformed notion of the market, because several features of Chinese markets made people very cautious about information in an open economy. The studies of the historical market in China have a chance of contributing to the development of economic theory.

This paper, which is based upon my previous works and recent study, is an attempt to solve these questions by examining the historical character of the Chinese market system in the late Qing and early Republican periods. To tell my conclusion first, my analysis leads towards the opposite side of recent works. Chinese economy was functioned upon its own economic discipline. British and other Western merchants, much less Japanese, were at first yielded to the China’s own commercial discipline however they resisted, claiming their own rights stipulated in the “unequal treaties.” Then, after learning their own failures, they invented how to manipulate Chinese economic discipline as they pleased.
The best sources to prove the above perspective and to trace the process of its decline are civil case records between Chinese and foreign merchants and diplomatic negotiations to settle these disputes according to the “unequal treaty” system.
These documents raise an utterly different image of the process of China’s “semi-colonization” from that of former Chinese diplomatic historians. China’s “semi-colonization” was not brought about by the foreigners. It was pioneered by some Chinese who had close relationship with foreigners for their excellent language ability or else. They could exploit their own status. In order to protect their own income and property with the “unequal treaty” system, they utilized their close relationship with foreigners, especially British and Japanese, in every way. Their activities were the genuine causes of the various commercial disputes. At first, foreigners were entirely unaware what the activities of their native business partners or employees meant in the Chinese society. Only after noticing its impact on the Chinese society by chance, could they follow their paths to lead the collapse of the Chinese commercial order.
By introducing the process how the British and the Japanese merchants learnt the China’s own economic discipline, and the paths of the “economic aggression,” this paper will show the peculiar character of the Chinese market system in this period.

If we try to establish the model of Chinese market, or at least to share any belief about the market, then it gets important to ascertain if there are any specific set of characters of transaction rules unique to China, and different from other parts of the world. Are our “shared beliefs” found solely in Chinese society and not in other societies? “Fierce competition among separate individuals” may be found in lots of villages in the nineteenth century Kiangnan and north China plain, but could it be found in the tenth century Hunan, or in southern China two millennia ago? Isn’t that shared by muslim or other pre-industrial commercial economies? North China reached demographic equilibrium already in the Eastern Han period, but Middle Yangtze cores were far from equilibrium as late as the Sung period (Hartwell 1982). In Taiwan immigrants from Chinese continent dominated the island no earlier than in the nineteenth century.
The purpose of this paper is to present some empirical findings on Sung legal culture, which is distinguished from that of Ming and Ch’ing, all based on a very close cultural background. Focusing on a few particular cases of transactional conflict and legal statues, this paper will explore how the Sung government recognized these common transactional problems in land and how they tried to cope with them in contrast with Ch’ing. Comparative analysis is a way to throw lights on the common traits shared by Sung and Ch’ing, as well as the difference.

This paper re-examines the role of intermediaries in market transactions within the ‘China market’. Through a comparative study of four main lines of trade (rice, flour, matches, and cement) crossing through pre-industrial economy to the industrial one, this paper aims at articulating the role of market intermediaries in not only bringing information concerning buyers and sellers, nor simply providing services such as market intelligence, but also support the flow of the commodity by partially financing the trade they were involved in. These case studies, therefore, lead one to reconsider the role of market intermediaries with reference to their financial capacity and to revise the configuration of China’s market order in light of finance and capital.

The appearance of the silk filatures under the Japanese control (i.e., The Central China Silk Company) alongside of small silk works beyond that control (i.e., domestic small filatures around Wuxi was a product of the Sino-Japanese War. Because silk industry played an important role in China’s and Japan’s national economies, and the two countries always competed with each other in the raw silk world market, as soon as Japan occupied the main silk production area of China (i.e., Jiangnan), she tried to adjust Chinese silk industry in order to protect the future of Japanese silk industry. The Central China Silk Company, which was established in August 1938 under the Japanese control policy, tried to monopolize the production and distribution of the filature silk in Central China. The silk filature in Wuxi area was the strategic post of the Company’s management. The meager wages and poor conditions of the laborers remained unchanged. The material cocoons were bought from cocoon hong under the Japanese control; its price was cheaper than market price. Because of the limited recovery of productivity, there had a large surplus of labor force and cocoons, while raw silk was in great demand. As a result, a lot of domestic small filature appeared. These small filatures had poor equipments, trifling capital and uncertain quality of product. The products of the Company and the small works were both sent to Shanghai for export. However, 65% of the exported silk of Shanghai was from domestic small filatures. Moreover, the total number of machines of domestic small filatures was garter than that of the Company. This implied that the Japanese monopoly policy of silk industry in central China was carried out to little effect.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss in a highly hypothetical way the main characteristics of Chinese market structure in the early modern period. Some ideal models of market structure are presented in order to clarify the implications of the recent debates over the Ming-Qing markets. Then the author argues that the "chains of ponds" model is useful for the analysis of the economic fluctuations and market order in early modern China.

Several years ago, I wrote a paper on the formation of the branch networks of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank (hereafter abbreviated as SCSB). In that paper, I tried to emphasize how SCSB strategically, successfully, and by what methods to create a nationwide branch networks. Say for example, the SCSB used its affiliate firm The China Travel Service as its vanguard in cultivating local business connections. This was regarded as important to SCSB’s decision in opening branches in different regions of China. Obviously, I have undermined the importance of the enforcement of these branch networks on one hand, and the position of branch network system in the overall SCSB’s administration and management.
The SCSB’s founder Chen Guangfu (also known as K.P. Chen) was a returned student from America. As his friend Zhang Jia’ao commented what Chen bringing from America to China was American style of banking, offering a wide range of banking service which functioned as a ‘department store.’ Chen also brought the idea of ‘serving the society’ (fuwu shehui) from America, which had been used as a slogan in training the SCSB’s employees and attracted attention from the society. Nevertheless, from the beginning of forming the branches, Chen relied on personal networks in managing his branches wherever at Shanghai or elsewhere in the country. When he was aware the weakness of these networks particularly in the early of 1930s when SCSB was over-expanding, he tried to implement strict control on these branch networks by two ways: firstly, setting up an institutional system to mange all the SCSB branches; secondly, centralizing all the administrative power to the Chief Executive Officer (zongjingli) and making himself to occupy this position.
By using various sources including personal diary, memoirs, autobiography, and archives of the SCSB, this paper will mainly focus on the branching system of the SCSB, indicating how the personal networks had finally been replaced by the institutional networks.

Opium has been an important topic in Western contact with 19th century China. Previous related research has mainly focused on opium imports. This paper discusses China’s native opium. China’s native opium was produced in peripheral regions of China. In addition to markets in these areas, large amounts of it also marketed in China’s core regions. This essay uses native opium in Late Qing China as an example for looking at the circulation of products from China’s peripheral areas to core regions.
Since opium was introduced to China from the West, through the market of native opium, we can also see the influences of Western economic forces on China’s spatial relations. Because of China’s vast area, internal trade was important. Since the Maritime Customs has left behind more complete sources on external trade, in modern Chinese economic history research concerning external trade, such as silk and tea exports and cotton yarn and textile imports, are far more abundant than those on internal trade. Sources for this paper’s discussion of the marketing of China’s native opium are scattered but numerous. From these scattered but extremely abundant materials, we could sketch a picture of China’s internal trade that will help us to understand a large economic system like China.
The time scope of this paper’s discussion is mainly from 1870s to 1906, because the 1870s were the point in time when China’s native opium clearly started to overtake imported opium and 1907 was the point in time when China’s ten-year opium suppression movement was launched.
The materials used for this essay come primarily from the Chinese Maritime Customs’ Annual Reports, Decennial Reports, and Special Series dealing with opium, the British Parliamentary Papers, Chinese-government official documents, the collected writings of officials, as well as investigations by contemporary Western observers.

In France the Seven Years' War (officially 1756-63, though fighting began in 1754) resulted in a major economic downturn and adversely affected the Parisian capital market. During the same years Nicolas-Claude Flocquet (died February 1764) was a master purser (boursier) with a modest shop on the Ile de la Cité. In many respects typical of Parisian artisans of his day, he is unusual in the wealth of documentation that he left behind, including his outgoing correspondence (1752-64), accounts of sales (1755-64) and post-mortem inventory (1764). This paper examines how he adapted his commercial and financial strategies to the peculiar challenges imposed by the Seven Years' War, even as he helped his insolvent friends and relations negotiate with their creditors. It finds that, by reducing transaction costs, the contraction of credit and relative reversion to a cash economy partly compensated for the decline in sales, but also strained relations between clients and suppliers. Ultimately, to survive the crisis, shopkeepers needed to draw on an intangible reserve of trust and goodwill among their business contacts.

Why do the Genoese preferred French annuities? The question arise from Giulio Giacchero’s own question about the political and financial pro-spanish choice of Genoese Republic during XVIthe century (“Perché i genovesi preferirono la Spagna ?” ). We are dealing with a slightly different problem, though. The Genoese get involved with French public annuities as they redeployed their investment accros Europe, right after their apex during the so-called “century of the Genoese” (1550-1630). From the second half of the XVIIthe century on, the merchant-bankers increasingly diverted their capital from southern and spanish area, from short-term, hi-rate investments, toward central and northern Italy public debt, carrying a weaker interest . Perpetual annuities issued by the French monarchy, notably the rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris, bursted into the portfolios of the Genoese Gotha during the last decades of the XVIIthe century. This move paved the way for intensification of the Genoese investments in France during the Enlightenment, as G. Felloni have shown .
The sudden appeal of French annuities was not obvious, because both solvency and reputation of monarchy as debtor were no longer guaranteed by late XVIIthe century. Creditors experienced partial bankruptcies, with capital being only partly refunded, or interest payment reduced during Colbert’s Office, then during the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697) and then again during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713). These hardships led the French monarchy to rely on various tricks, undermining the safety of annuities as investments. With the growing
The rerouting of investment, from Spanish to French monarchy, by the most prominent families of the Genoese oligarchy seems rather enigmatic. While the New Institutional Economics school seemingly demonstrated that investment flourish with enforcement of property rights, and reduction of both uncertainty and transaction costs , the situation here is quite different. We need to explain why the Genoese elites decided to invest in these rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville de Paris regardless of the situation. We offer some hypothesis drawn from a careful analysis of individual transaction: a microeconomic focus, then. We first need to assess the appeal of high interest rates granted by the French monarchy, desperately craving for money while the City-State offered the lowest rate over Europe. Then the French monarchy somewhat twisted the market for annuities during the process of building it, in order to attract foreign capital: this will be analysed in the light of recent theoretical development . Our hypothesis is that the high interest rates and preferential rights from the late XVIIthe century were complemented by control from Genoese agents living in France. Hence the macro framework is complemented by micro-level devices to reduce information asymmetry and agency dilemma. We will eventually emphasize the social dimension of market organization, to understand why general rules (toward foreigners) were only targeted at and implemented by the Genoese.

Loaning was a more or less informal activity between human actors in the early modern countryside and people from all population groups were involved in it. This comparative paper will concentrate on landowning peasants, their credit relationships and intangible assets in Sweden and Finland 1796—1815. Landowning peasants had credit relationships with various population groups, which was a sign of e.g. trust and obligations. The peasants of two parishes in Sweden and Finland have been chosen for a more precise analysis here. The two parishes have both similarities and dissimilarities, which again is an advantage for the purposes of comparison.

Over 800 probate inventories are the main primary sources that will be analysed in this paper. The same Swedish law passed in 1734 made it compulsory in both Sweden and Finland to make probate inventories after the death of every person; the whole property of the deceased had to be estimated and listed, including all credit owed to her/him. As this paper studies the amount of credit held by peasants, these credit relationships will also be analysed as networks. In addition the size of the properties will be studied.

This is an extremely early draft. Please do not cite.

The paper, divided into four parts, will propose a synthetic viewpoint on the credit relationship in late medieval Europe. It leans more specifically on the Parisian case.
The understanding of the late medieval credit grew rich for approximately fifteen years. The credit was a practice common to all the sectors of the economy and at every level of the society : beside the bank credit to merchants, princes and cities, there was the regional credit to trade, to craft industries and to agriculture, the local credit linked to life cycle and the daily credit to consumption. Beside the quasi-professional loan, like pawn broking, Jewish loan, “Lombard” loan and bank loan, the credit was also stimulated by logic of reciprocity. It weaved the links of a domestic world, following the family or professional relationships, the traditional forms of social dependence and the internal community solidarities. That is why the credit was at the same time a diffuse economic phenomenon and a fundamental social behaviour. Since there was no bank system, the relations of credit were universal and multilateral and, as such, they were often inserted into relations which were not strictly financial like seigneury, wage relation, patronage, charity, friendship… The private credit developed from the 13th century (1), it spread along circuits which are described by scholars either as networks or as markets (2). This spreading of the private credit kept pace with the clarification of concepts, like usury, with the development of values and of institutional processes allowing regulating it, that is to say with a culture of debt (3) and with a politics of credit (4).

Banks function by selling savers a package of services and charging them a share of the price paid by the end users (borrowers) of the commodity savers wish to sell. The services banks sell are screening and monitoring of borrowers and their projects, as well as risk spreading via diversification. From the banks’ marginal condition, knowing rates and collateral posted, we can use the internal records of an English bank (1850 to 1885) to quantify the probability of default estimated by their directors for some 200 borrowers. We can then relate the expectations of the directors to a set of borrower specific characteristics to evaluate the relative importance of tangible (buildings, machinery, stocks) and intangible (reputation) assets in allowing applicants access to credit.

Trade credit is a peculiar form of financing, in that it tends to be invisible when compared to bank and consumer credit. It is also less regulated and more reliant on the norms and customs of trade than are other types of financing. Yet trade credit is ubiquitous: in most parts of the world, the buying and selling of goods involves the extension of credit (in the form of time) to buyers, whether for a few days, several months, or even years.

This paper is part of a book-length investigation of the institutional and socio-cultural history of trade credit around the world during the twentieth century. More specifically, the study looks at the cultural and institutional drivers of information sharing and “trust.” It seeks to understand whether institutional forms and social conventions tended to converge across countries, or if differences persisted. The study also seeks to uncover any cross-border learning that might have occurred.

This paper will summarize part of the history of the Andean herders during the colonial period. In the Andes, the realm of pastoralism was neglected, and even denied, for many years by academics. It was only in the 1960s when two scholars started to write about pastoralism. Until today, these studies have remained scarce, and they are mostly anthropological and archeological, focused on llamas and alpacas. Herders are almost "invisible" in colonial studies and difficult to trace in the sources, but in the last years they came slowly more to the fore.
After the conquest, the Spaniards reorganized the American world in order to satisfy their primary needs: food, labor, and transportation–amongst others. In order to organize the mining labor force, they moved thousands of persons per year. During the late 16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries –during the silver boom–the most important mining city in the Andes surpassed 130.000 inhabitants, and there were many other settlements around smaller mining centers. All these urban inhabitants needed to be fed, and because of the location of these cities, food was brought often from distant places.
The only herders the Spaniards found in America were living in the Andes. For a long time, the llamas were the only animals for transportation until the mules–brought from Europe–became more frequent, from about 1630 onwards. But in some places the grass was not good enough for mules, so the llamas remained prominent there. Herders were considered rich and important in the first centuries of colonial times, and they inhabited relatively populated highlands.
Since most of the mines were located in dry uplands, were herders used to live, these herders worked in the mines, transported food, firewood, metals, salt and other items. They also paid tributes and participated in the colonial economy. But because of their mobility, they eluded colonial impositions when possible. The paper will give an example of these circumstances taken from Lípez, an arid high place in the southern Andes, during the 17th century.

At the time of its annexation to the British Empire, the economy of the Kulu region (Himachal Pradesh) rested upon a long-established and finely balanced system of agro-pastoralism. This system enabled the pre-colonial State to carry out extensive resource mobilization in a mountainous area that has limited agricultural land and was almost entirely lacking in monetization. Traditionally, it was only through the peasant-pastoralists that the State could successfully appropriate the natural resources—forests and pastures—within its territory. Under British rule, however, the traditional practices/ rights of the Kulu agro-pastoralists were reinterpreted to serve the larger colonial purpose. Periodic revenue settlements, implemented in Kulu by district officials, became the means through which this was sought to be done. A different rationality and an entirely new set of priorities came to mediate the relationship between the State and its subjects. As a result, one may argue, a kind of State directed colonial modernity emerged. This has prejudiced the functioning even of the modern Indian State and how it defines ‘development’ and its associated aspects of modernity. The bureaucracy of independent India—like its colonial predecessors—has continued to regard pastoralists as the outdated remnants of a pre-modern society.

Scholars journeying through the alps in the 18th Century encountered in a certain region a peculiarity only few of them found not worth mentioning in their diaries: Some valleys were entirely green. Almost all fertile ground was used as pastures and meadows. The landscapes were litterally described to be „parks“ and matched perfectly contemporary romantic notions of timeless alpine pastoral livelihood.

The economy on the northern prealpine valleys of the western alps from Savoy to Western Austria can be described as „type pastoral évolué“ (Martonne 1926). There, by the end of the 18th Century, agriculture meant raising cattle and providing dairy products for export. In the Middle Ages, however, subsistence economy based on grain, sheep and goats had been prevailing. A fundamental transformation must have taken place between the 14th and the 18th century, but when exactly, by which factors and why so thoroughly?

So far, the answers have been manifold and not yet fully satisfactory. In this paper, they are to be reevaluated by focussing on two aspects of alpine mountain pastoralism: the thriving economy of northern italian cities; the haymaking on remote alpine precipices even beyond the reach of cows or goats – the so called „Wildheuen“. The former points to the heavy demand for cattle and dairy products. The latter illustrates the intensive pressure on the supply of animal-fodder, not in the least for those on the bottom fringe of society. The „type pastoral évolué“ appears as the result of an intensive specialisation and modernisation that first took off within medieval elites and after centuries involved the entire society.

This paper deals with the evolution of mountain pastoralism in Spain from 1500 to 2000. I argue that there were two different advents of modernity for the Spanish livestock sector during this period: (a) the constitution of a market society in the early nineteenth century; and (b) the incorporation of industrial inputs for animal feeding from 1960 onwards. Given the environmental conditions prevailing in Spain, it was only the second of these ruptures that shifted comparative advantage for livestock production from the mountains to the lowlands. Each of the two ruptures, however, created its own pressures for intensification and the gradual demise of pastoralist segments within the annual cycle of livestock raising.

Modernity has influenced the later part of the story of pastoralism on the Deccan plateau, especially with first the advent of the colonial rule and then with the coming in of the forces of liberalisation and globalization. In this paper we will narrate the story of the decline of pastoralism from centre of polity in the early medieval times in upland mountainous zone of the Deccan in Western India to being reduced to margins in Modern times. As is wont the placement of the ‘centre’ and the periphery is as per the context in which the idea of the centre is debated. It will be our argument that the ‘centre’ and the periphery’ need not be taken as a description of binary opposites, but rather a continuum, an unfolding canvas where the great drama of state formation is enacted again and again. Pastoral Nomadism in the south Asian context has remained a neglected field of study. This is all the more surprising as the world’s largest nomadic population resides in south Asia. The range of the variety of herds found in subcontinent is astonishing, from camels and sheep to ducks pigs and guinea fowls and lastly bovines and equines.
Pastoral nomadism has been variously understood. A.M. Khazanov defines it as a ‘food extracting economy where the entire community is dependent on its herds for the supply of food.’ Dyson-Hudson suggest that pastoral nomads are those who choose as their basic strategy for providing year round food for their herds the movement of livestock to pasturage rather than bringing fodder to herds. The distance traversed by such movement, its duration, frequency and pattern may vary depending on many variables.

Agro-pastoralists hold land rights and use either their own labour or hired labour to cultivate land and grow staple crops. While the ownership of livestock is still highly valued, agro-pastoralists’ herds are usually smaller than those found in other pastoral systems, possibly because they no longer rely solely on livestock and depend on a finite grazing area which can be reached from their villages within a day’s journey. The paper will try to put across a case that the decline of pastoralism is also linked to commercialisation of agricultura and the adevent of the colonial state in the Deccan

Pastoralism was a prominent feature of the nineteenth century Uttrakhand Himalaya. Many communities combined it with agriculture. While some, like the Bhotiyas and the Gujars, were completely dependent on livestock for their survival. The Gujars were buffalo keepers and the herds of the Bhotiyas mainly constituted of sheep, goats and yak. Both of these communities, which are focus of this paper, practiced transhumance. They, on the one hand made use of alpine pastures at the high altitudes in the Himalaya during the summer, and on the other the rich pastures of the Tarai, at the foot of the Himalaya, in the winter. The transhumance practices of these communities have been considerably transformed in the last two centuries. In this paper we shall examine the nature of this transformation and reasons behind it.
The process of modernization has undermined, to some extent, the transhumance practices. The setting up of the colonial rule brought new notion of property in India. The new laws of property favoured settle communities over nomadic people. This encouraged sedantarisation. Further, ‘scientific forestry’ was introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century in India. New laws were enacted to manage forests. These laws completely transformed the pattern of resource use. As the forests were reserved by the state, they no longer remained easily accessible to pastoralists. We shall examine the nature of the restrictions imposed on the Bhotiyas and the Gujars and how that affected their mobility.
In the post-colonial period modernization became more intrusive and transformed the livelihood strategies of many communities. The Gujars and the Bhotiyas also not remained completely unaffected by it. Many areas used earlier as pastures were now occupied by settled communities or were urbanized. In the 1970s with the rise of new conservation movements many areas, which were earlier freely available for grazing, were declared wildlife sanctuaries and national parks. These protected areas were made inaccessible, making it difficult for pastoralists to continue their transhumance. We shall analyse how the Bhotiyas and the Gujars are facing these new challenges. We shall also compare the responses of the two communities to the new situation.

Abstract: Mountain pastoralism in the Pamirian Knot has been significantly transformed from the 19th to the 21st century. The development path, the socio-economic set-up and structures of political organisation have depended on spheres of influence of dominating powers, affiliation to mighty neighbours and subsequently to parties in the Cold War in as much as on internal reforms and rebellions. In this contribution case studies from pastoral communities of the Pamirian Knot are presented in relation to the socio-political changes which have affected their survival and adaptive strategies in a harsh environment. The spectrum ranges from forced adjustments in the aftermath of revolutionary movements to reforms which have been inspire by power games and developmentalism. Case studies presented will be taken from Afghanistan, Tajikistan, PR of China and Pakistan. The significant interventions which led to structural changes can be transformations such as happened in the sequence Emirate of Bokhara – Tsarist Russia – Soviet Union – Tajikistan, as well as in the framework of establishing Afghan dominance in Badakhshan or in the post-revolutionary interventions in Chinese Xinjiang or in the integration of the Karakoram communities in the newly created nation state of Pakistan. Modernity does not come into the picture through political interventions alone, modernity is expressed in development strategies based on thoughts derived from modernization theory which surprisingly (or not) is something like a unifying force in the external attempts to change mountain communities and their practices of pastoralism.

This paper is devoted to the study of the livestock holdings in the Alps, with a particular focus on the area of the valleys north of Brescia. The topic is analyzed in the context of the relationship between the city and the neighbouring rural areas. Two economic activities are studied more in depth: the cattle breeding for the production of cheese and the sheep farming for the production of wool. In the first case we observe that the cheese dealers of Brescia manage the production and market the final good. The cheese, in fact, is largely exported and the industry is thus shaped by the large information costs necessary for the establishment of a commercial network that requires substantial economies of scale. In the second case, the business doesn't require such informations and network so it is managed by local farmers that constitute a wealthy social class whose activities go beyond farming and include banking.

Based on a summary of currently available archaeological data, this paper focuses on the various ways in which herding and herders articulated with other activities and actors in the South Andes (highlands of SW Bolivia, NW Argentina, and N Chile) during the last few centuries before the Spanish conquest of America. This relationship took different forms, including pastoral specialization and inter-ethnic trade, political/ethnic integration and redistribution, and economic diversification at the household level, among others. It is argued that this variability cannot be entirely accounted by environmental diversity, but was also a consequence of changing historical conditions, such as those related to endemic warfare and territorial fragmentation during the 13th and 14th centuries or to the integration of the whole area into the Inka State in the 15th century. We discuss how, in each one of these scenarios, pastoralists found different ways of integrating with the non-pastoral world, both in practice and representation.

The long process of inclusion of the once so called “Republic of Indians” into the territorial, political, legal and moral framework of the Peruvian state involved a series of changes in the judicial status of those populations living under it. This paper examines the legal and judicial metamorphosis experienced by a shepherd population of Southern Peru (Phinaya, District of Pitumarca, Province of Canchis, Department of Cuzco) located at the heart of the massif of Ausangate over the 4500 meters sea level. It is based on state sources of the 19th and 20th centuries related to the recognition of this population as an “indigenous” and “peasant” community, on ethnographic evidence from my own fieldwork, and on studies about other shepherd populations of the area. The aim of the paper is to show how far the liberal policies designed from the first quarter of 19th century onwards recognized the existence of shepherd populations in the territory of the nation state. Moreover, it explains in which sense the 20th century policies –in particular but not exclusively the Agrarian Reform of 1969– designed to measure, demarcate and incorporate the population to a newly boundary-defined territory responded to the main problem of a society exclusively concentrated in the raising of alpaca, llama and sheep: namely spatial mobility.

No currency can be infinitely supplied; in contrast, monetary unit of account can be infinitely given to any size of transaction. History shows that the finiteness in currencies tended to detach its local value from the original value in terms of the monetary account. The tendency encouraged traders to make plural monetary accounts in order to respectively stabilize adjustments between demands and supplies. Meanwhile, in some societies, social circumstances made business more dependent on debt relationship among local inhabitants and consequently led to cementing local account with wider one.
Making comparisons among China, Japan, and England, we can clearly distinct the characteristics of early modern (or before industrialization) monetary systems between them. China kept anonymous business in local market with autonomous currency supply which made multiple accounts of money coexist, while daily transactions at local towns in England significantly depended on oral contracts, whose abstractness consequently led to cementing local account with wider one. Japanese local economy also had tendency to rely on named relationship.
However, we should not take the linear viewpoint that a currency-independent economy like England evolved out of currency-dependent one like China as commercial activities developed. Societies dependent on personal credit had been always at the risk of non-performance even though some of local credit system made it easier to build a pool of unemployed monies and happened to establish local banks. The difference between the two patterns had better be thought to represent a divergent path for societies which faced a serious liquidity crisis.

Due to the heterogeneousness of the multiple networks of bargaining, rationing, and gift transactions where debts are created and have to be honoured through payments, heterogeneousness exacerbated by social and spatial divisions, plurality of public and private “pay-communities” (circuits, spheres of exchange, networks), and therefore of means of payment is the usual situation in statist-capitalist societies. This plurality and the correlated latent situation of variability of the levels of confidence in the different means of payment, threaten the uniqueness of the system of account, as soon as real monies have their values fixed within this system. The paper will put this contradiction between plurality of payments and uniqueness of account at the core of the institutional nature of modern money and of the rules constitutive of the “moneying” regime necessary to organize the complementarity between the different means of payment. This way of revisiting money from a complementary viewpoint will be illustrated by the case of fiscal monies issued in Argentina by many provincial and the federal governments during the so-called convertibility crisis of 2001-2003.

The paper will then proceed in three steps. The first part will reassess some basic facts
and controversies relative to the French monetarization process throughout the 19th
century. The second part will be devoted to the banknotes circulation and its links to specie circulation after a brief presentation of the Franco‐Prussian War consequences.
The third part will address the ideological and social issues of banknotes circulation, and
the conclusion will try to link these changes to the evolving characteristics of the French
monetary covenant, in social and political terms.

-NEW VERSION UPLOADED-
As other European countries of that time, Early modern France was characterized by its monetary plurality. The purpose of the text is to present this plurality and analyse the ways it was articulated. After a presentation of the intention of the paper, Section 2 presents the problem of monetary articulations, referring to existing literature: competition is too often the only articulation mode referred to by economists; however, an other one is increasingly analyzed, complementarity. We state that complementarity is too vague to be relevant enough and build a conceptual framework identifying four distinct articulation modes : competition, simultaneousness, supplementarity and autonomy. Section 3 presents a short overview of monetary plurality in the French early modern period and it applies the theoretical framework to it in order to stress the various possible combinations of articulation modes of money. It emphasizes the case of royal coins as being close to supplementarity, the case of gold coins as being close to competition, and the case of méreaux as being between supplementarity and autonomy. Section 4 addresses briefly the question as to whether the monetary complexity of that period means chaos. The role of social stratification and intermediates in reducing the complexity of monetary plurality is emphasized. Section 5 concludes.

Multiple Currencies and their Complementary Relationships
-The Indian Scenario – Early Modern Era-
(Abstract)
Sushil Chaudhury

An attempt has been made in this paper to show that, though multiple currencies were used simultaneously in many parts of early modern India, especially before the Colonial rule, there existed a complementary relationship among the different varieties of currencies, and as such there was hardly any confusion or chaos in the monetary system. It worked quite smoothly because, first, the state kept a strong vigilance over minting, and the monetary system; secondly, because of the indigenous system of money-changing and long-distance credit, known as hundi (bill of exchange), facilitating the smooth functioning of the money market.

For the convenience of analysis I shall discuss the problem in five sections. The first will be devoted to a survey of the coinage system of the Great Mughals (1575-1707). It was the Mughal coinage which later formed the basis of the coinage system in Bengal under the nawabs (1704-65) and during the early colonial period. It will be shown here how the trimetallic currencies of the Mughals, with the silver rupee as the basic coin, worked without much problem till early eighteenth century. The second section will examine the scenario in Bengal in the pre-colonial era when despite prevalence of multiple currencies, the country did not witness much chaos or confusion, and everything worked well with complementary relationship among various currencies.The third section will be concerned with the chaos and confusion under the early colonial period as reported by the Company administration, and how it tried to cope with the situation and with what success. It will be shown that with the weakening of the Jagat Seths (who controlled all the merchant-bankers and shroffs) and their subsequent elimination, following the English take-over of the province, the shroffs had a field day, and had the Company officials, inexperienced as they were in handling the indigenous money markets, at ransom. The next section will deal with the question of “humble monies”. Generally not much has been said so far about the role of the low-value currencies like copper coins, cowries, badams (almonds), etc. which are termed “humble monies”, and which were used mostly for petty transactions. It will be interesting to try to find out the complementary relationship between them, and currencies of higher value like gold and silver. In the last section some tentative conclusions will be drawn on the basis of earlier analyses.

The role of the unit of account in the Roman Empire is an issue that is rarely asked. Traditionally, it was agreed that the currency of the silver coin of 3.4 g is both a currency and both the unit of account. It is also admitted that this coin eventually dominated the local monetary systems and therefore plays a unifying role. In summary, the traditional theory is to think that the currency of money (the denarius) circulated throughout the whole Roman world.
A detailed analysis of the coin circulation and the issues of Roman coins suggests that this view is incorrect. We need to be aware of considering the reality of the constitution of the monetary system and the development history of the Empire.

A main concern of planning and negotiation towards the end of World War II was to provide a sufficient supply of international liquidity, such as to facilitate global trade and avoid persistent balance of payments disequilibria. This common objective was addressed in quite different ways by the Keynes and White plans.
In assessing the merits of alternative monetary regimes, the debate has focused primarily on their capacity to avoid inflationary or deflationary pressures, by adapting the quantity of international money to the volume of global trade. Yet it is even more important to appreciate whether the liquidity created within each system is actually made to flow or not, in exchange for goods and services.
This paper will build on the distinction between international “liquidity” (intended as the peculiar asset that a country can spend in any direction, but also withhold from circulation) and “liquidness” (intended as the quality of being liquid, i.e. of being ready to flow freely and continuously). In the light of this distinction, the main objective of an international monetary system may be restated in the following terms: to provide a source of liquidity capable of maintaining its liquidness. In this perspective, it is essential to consider not only the sources of liquidity provided by alternative schemes, but also the existence and capacity of sinks, designed to absorb it.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the American and British schemes, with particular attention to the various features by which they provide for the creation of liquidity, on the basis of gold stocks and commodity flows, and for the destruction of liquidity, through inducements to absorb credit balances and not to accumulate them indefinitely.
Reinterpreting in this perspective the monetary regime eventually established at Bretton Woods may help understand the nature of post-war disequilibria and, in particular, the reasons why it was possible to pass from a dollar shortage to dollar glut, i.e. from a lack of international liquidity to an excess of international liquidity, without ever attaining an adequate measure.

Between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries China underwent a series of monetary transitions: first, a shift during the Southern Song dynasty from a monetary standard based on bronze coin to a multiple currency system that including paper notes, bronze coin, and uncoined silver; second, the emergence of a unified paper currency system under Mongol rule; and finally, the collapse of the paper money standard and the de facto adoption of an (uncoined) silver standard, with bronze coin serving as a subsidiary currency. In the early thirteenth century, foreign rulers in north China—first the Jurchen Jin kingdom and subsequently the Mongols—began to issue paper currency denominated in silver. In 1260 the Mongol ruler Khubilai Khan introduced a new paper currency denominated in bronze coin but with a fixed exchange value in silver. The Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) founded by Khubilai adopted silver units (measured by weight) as its official money of account. In addition, the paper notes that after 1287 served as the only officially-sanctioned currency were commonly valued in silver units although still denominated in bronze coin.
This paper examines the transition from bronze coin to silver as the basic money of account within the Chinese empire, with particular attention to the period of Mongol rule. The paper will address the spatial as well as temporal changes in money use and how these changes affected the money of account standard. The interrelationship between paper money and silver played the pivotal role in the adoption of a silver standard. However, regional and local variations in money use and monies of account continued to persist.

The multiplicity of currencies, past and present, does not break down neatly or completely according to the classic “functions of money”. Differences of form and function open up to differences of terminology, counting, calculation, and techniques of various sorts, including mnemonics and accounting. Media of exchange are, in fact, stored and accounted, even though not as classic “stores of value”. This paper focuses on cash, starting from African historical “commodity currencies”. It then identifies analogs in the present and in the anthropological library, to identify empirical cases and new sources in linguistic anthropology that may be relevant to the growing theorization of present-day currencies' multiplicity.

Pehr Niclas Christiernin is by modern economist viewed as the first “real” Swedish economist. What the term “real” implies is that he was the first scholar to conduct more modern analysis of economic mechanism. His theories on the relationship between money, prices and exchange rates are viewed as a more elaborated quantity theory than that of David Hume who’s “On Money as a Medium of Exchange” was published in 1752.
In this paper I revise the works by Christiernin as a work set in its own time. My aim is to understand his theory from its basic definitions of the concepts analyzed. From there I intend to build the synthesis of Christiernin’s theory, based on the definitions and the theoretical framework of his time, and thus try to avoid to the extent possible any interpretations based on later monetary theories and ideas.
Anyone has the right to ask why such a revision on the writings of Christiernin is of importance, even if it might gloom the reputation of Christiernin as an economist in the international setting, and there are two important answers to this: 1) Christiernin was an empirical scholar, which means that he observed what was going on and then attempted (and in many ways succeeded) to build economic theories based on these empirical observations – this means that we can learn a lot about how economic interactions actually worked during his time, what financial instruments were used, how, by whom, how were transactions secured and so on. 2) By going back to understand the fundaments of how economic interactions worked during his time, what instruments that emerged and how they were used we will be able to better understand the relationships between economic activities, financial instruments, money and exchange rates. These are questions that have puzzled economists, and still puzzle economists, all over the world.

Abstract

The use of monies of account in exchange banks: comparing the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, the Hamburg Bank and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation

Willem G. Wolters
(Nijmegen University)


From the late Middle Ages until the 19th century imaginary monies of account have been used for different purposes or functions, viz., (1) as a government instrument for the management of the monetary system in a country; (2) as a bookkeeping instrument in merchant firms and large trading organizations (such as the Dutch East Indies Company); (3) as a money of exchange in exchange banks. This paper focuses on the third function, using as examples the Amsterdam Exchange Bank (1609-1820), the Hamburg Bank and the Hongkong Bank (second half of the 19th century). The hypothesis defended here is that the use of special bank money (“banco”) had advantages for managing the bank affairs by limiting direct access to its funds and facilitating profitable exchange operations. This function is different from the practices mentioned under point (1) and (2) above. The paper will compare the use and function of monies of account or monies of exchange in a number of exchange banks from the 17th through the 19th centuries, viz., the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, the Hamburg Bank and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. The paper will then explore the advantages and functions of these bank unit of account systems, both for the banks themselves and for the wider merchant communities.

Recent economic literature highlight that migrant networks help to overcome the informal barriers that exist in the international markets and boost international trade and investment (Rauch and Casella 2002). However, it is not entirely clear what networks precisely are.
The most cited theoretical definition of networks is "a set of actors who know each other relevant characteristics or can learn them through referral" (Granovetter 1973).
Networks are closely related to social capital. Rauch (1996) cites Putnam (1993) who defines social capital as "features of social organizations, such as [...] norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit". Similarly, "good social capital", as defined by Guiso (2008), enhances cooperation and trust between individuals in the whole society and is constituted by "those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, reliogious, and social groups trasnsmit from generation to generation and enable their members to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives".
All these concepts are difficult to measure empirically. Up to now, stocks or shares of immigrants by contry of origin in the host country have been the variable universally used as a proxy of networks (Rauch 2001; Rauch and Trinidade 2002; Wagner, Head and Ries 2003).
This paper proposes a different measure of networks which is given by the associative activity of a given ethnic group in a wide number of foreign countries. Specifically, we utilize data on Italian associations abroad, with the idea that this variable has a finer explanatory power in generating the transnational social capital conducive to the formation of netowrks that prompt bilateral FDI. We estimate the magnitude of such network externalities (OLS-IV) also taking into account a number of other control variables that can influence investment decisions. These variables include proxies for socio-cultural and institutional similarities betweeen countries (i.e., distance, quality of governance, associative propensity, regional agreements, religion) and proxies for wealth and market size of both the home and the host country. (i.e., per capita GDP and population). The main result is that Italian associations abroad have a significant posotive effect on Italy's both inward and outward FDI.
To interpret the econometric evidence, we present an historical profile of Italian associations abroad. In this section we also focus on some case studies to show how Italian associations abroad actaully acted to trompt international trade and investment between Italy and the country where their are hosted.

On the basis of a new comprehensive database including detailed information about foreign controlled companies in Italy, this paper analyzes the evolution in the nature, structure and sectoral distribution of foreign direct investments in Italy during the 30 years following the Second World War. In order to develop a systematic analysis of the available data, the first 100 foreign controlled firms ranked by total assets are examined across three benchmark years (1952, 1960 and 1972). After a brief introductory paragraph reviewing the existing literature on the topic, an in-depth analysis of the database is carried on. Sectoral destination, countries of origin and geographical distribution of the investments are also discussed in a following section, together with performance measures (in terms of returns and longevity). The quantitative evidence of the database is thus in a following paragraph put in relationship with the evolution in the general macroeconomic framework. Institutional and legal variables shaping FDIs destination influencing the trend of investments are considered as well, together with the constraints and opportunities provided by shifts in the technological paradigms.

Abstract:
This paper explores changes in the Dutch business system during the 20th century in relation to the strategies of Dutch multinational companies. A key element in this discussion will be the processes of globalisation and deglobalisation, which greatly influenced the organisation of multinationals and their approach to the national economy. This paper argues that Dutch multinational companies responded to the deglobalisation of the interwar years by embedding their local operating companies in the various national economies. By the chosen structure they strengthened the national economies and their focus on national interests. From the 1970s onwards the world economy became more global. Technological changes, the liberalisation of markets and the trend towards privatisation all seemed to make the local embeddedness of multinationals less relevant. The costs seemed to outweigh the benefits. At the same time shareholders placed more pressure on companies to improve their profitability. As a consequence, Dutch multinationals felt under pressure to change their organisational structure from a focus on nationally embedded subsidiaries into a business sector approach with global coordinating systems. Investment decisions were no longer based on national interests of home and host countries. The changing structure of the multinational companies can be seen as a response to the globalisation and at the same time underpinned that process of globalisation by global institution building. Exploring these shifts in strategies in the face of trends in globalisation and deglobalisation is particular relevant since the 2008 financial crisis, because of the present tendency of governments of taking action to protect their own national economies.

This paper explores how foreign direct investment interacts with host business systems. It does so examining the case of John Deere, one of the largest world manufacturer of farm equipment in the 20th century, in Spain, a country whose long delayed modernization process, which accelerated in the 1960s, has been related to both FDI and economic nationalism. The period studied begins in 1956, when John Deere decided to extent its manufacturing activities outside the US by acquiring the German producer Lanz and, as a result, its subsidiary in Spain.
Due to existing import-substitution policies, the multinational was forced to manufacture in the country both tractors and all the needed spare parts. John Deere introduced new methods of manufacturing and distributing farm equipment that transformed the industry and pushed the multinational to the top positions of the protected, host market. However, the Spanish branch could not be integrated into John Deere’s global strategy for the European Common Market. That turned into a challenge a few years later, as the sector began to be liberalized after Franco’s death in 1975. But the Spanish managers found a solution: manufacturing service parts for the rest of the group. In 1994 the last tractor manufactured in the country left the factory.

This case study shows, therefore, the influence exerted by the Spanish economic and institutional context on John Deere’s strategy, the impact of the multinational on the host business system, and the interaction between the Spanish subsidiary and the American managers.

Italy’s catch-up in the course of the 20th century has been nothing short of extraordinary, and yet the growth and internationalization of Italian big business has been relatively modest. Nonetheless, half a century ago an Italian company made what was at the time the largest-ever foreign takeover of an American company. The paper analyzes the Olivetti’s acquisition of Underwood and frames it in the broader picture of the literature on the management and performance of foreign companies in the United States. We provide a historical narrative focused on three main issues: 1) head office control and subsidiary autonomy; 2) Olivetti’s adaptation to the American business system; 3) the development of internal knowledge resources within the subsidiary. Lessons and implications are relevant for business historians and management scholars in general.

Foreign Direct Investments represented a very important tool for maturation of European economy during the Twentieth century. The joint venture probably represents the most intense kind of connection between foreign investors and local business systems. The main aim of the paper is to understand when, how, and why - in an historical perspective - joint ventures between national and foreign partners represented the most advantageous kind of foreign direct investment.
In order to provide at least a partial answer to these questions, the paper analyzes the existence and the features of large enterprises in which local and foreign partners jointly participated in three benchmark-years: 1950, 1973 and 2002. The focus is on two European nations that received huge flows of foreign direct investments: Italy and Spain.
The main findings of the research underline that the connections established through joint ventures between foreign investors and local entrepreneurship represented a quite important phenomenon in both countries all along the second half of the Twentieth century. But only in a specific nation and period they were stable and predominant: the years of the Francoist dictatorship in Spain. Among the reasons which could explain this phenomenon, the different legal context that countersigned the Spanish dictatorial regime certainly represents a key point. The legislative interpretation however it is not enough to understand the predominance of this kind of investments. To this purpose, some important factors as the particular social and cultural characteristics of the country that hosts the investments, the attitude to the risk of the investors and above all the fact that the partnership with the state, the banks, and the private entrepreneurship represented for foreign investors a winning tool to get notable competitive advantages in a context of dictatorship, relative economic closing and industrial backwardness, cannot be neglected.

This paper deals with the impact of sustained FDI on the entrepreneurial structure and capabilities of late developing countries. Based on a long-term and empirical analysis of the four major investors (France, United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States) in Spain, the paper shows that 1) foreign capital and know-how have been crucial to the modernization of Spain at macro- and micro-economic level; 2) non-economic factors have played a major role in the changing geography and intensity of FDI; 3) long term cooperation between domestic and foreign firms has been instrumental to cope with economic nationalism (up to the 1960s) as well as to prompt a learning process on the side of local entrepreneurs; 4) combined with the effects of economic liberalization, European integration, privatization, and deregulation, this learning process has produced a fundamental change in the capabilities, structure, and ambitions of domestic entrepreneurship, exemplified in the rise of Spanish multinational firms following Spain’s entry into the European Union in 1986. In addition, the paper seeks to characterize the investment patterns of the four largest and most influential investors in 20th century Spain, as well as to integrate some concepts borrowed from other social sciences into the historical analysis of FDI.

There is a wide literature in international business and business history which addresses the development of multinational enterprises from large countries such as the US, UK and Japan, as well as small countries, such as Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands. In a similar vein this paper follows the development of Portuguese foreign direct investment, where there is very little research done on the historical development of multinational business. The period from the 1960s until the present day is an important period in terms of the development of foreign direct investment and the multinational enterprise, and is also a period when data on Portuguese foreign direct investment started being collected in a systematic way. In the belief that the experience of Portugal provides a useful complement to earlier international business theory and business history, this study asks - why, despite being historically a very open economy in terms of trade, Portugal’s success in terms of FDI is limited; and also whether there anything particular about Portuguese Foreign direct investment.

In Switzerland, the strength of the national economy has been traditionally related with the nation’s capacity to export goods, services and capital, while the impact of inward direct investments on the national economy has been largely neglected.

The paper analyses the expansion of Swiss companies abroad as well as the activities of foreign companies in Switzerland since the 1950s and especially in the last two decades of the twentieth century, when the link between the competitiveness of the firms and the competitiveness of the nation - as their home-base – lost its traditional strength. Special attention will be given to those years in which major advances in the process of European integration were made, such as the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the creation of the single European market and its extension to the European Economic Area (EEA) between 1985 and 1992. Did Switzerland’s particular position within the overall process of European integration and especially her rejection of the EEA-Treaty in 1992 have a major impact on outbound and inbound FDI?

Compared with the very stable structure of large Swiss MNE since the 1920s, their composition and ranking changed considerably in the 1990s. We can therefore distinguish between a Chandlerian pattern of development characterised by the continued dominance of the same leading multinational companies up until the late 1980s and an evolutionary or Schumpeterian development characterised by a considerable reshuffling among the large MNE and the rising importance of smaller firms and of firms of the service sector. Foreign firms did not have a very prominent role in the Swiss economy, but their impact may still have been considerable, especially in those sectors where the competitiveness of domestic companies was weak. And their importance has clearly been increasing.

This paper aims to show some of the links between regional integration, strategies of implementation and economic growth. We therefore study Du Pont de Nemours and its arrival in Europe in the 1950s and the following decades. Between archival evidences and literatures, what can we say about the different strategies employed to implement in Europe? And what could have it changed?
Du Pont de Nemours began implementing in Europe in 1956. Its implementations followed closely the European integration and the subventions which were given to member countries and partners. Plus, the entry modes differ between the different countries in which Du Pont implemented and the moment it arrived in: Greenfield investments, Brownfield, Acquisition, Joint venture. Why did Du Pont choose different approaches at different times and locations? We will mainly explore the Spanish implementation, which consists in a Joint Venture, a Brownfield investment and a Greenfield one, to expose the strategies Du Pont could have chosen.
This paper intends to explore those different aspects of Du Pont implementations: the European relations and the strategies. The question asked in the end is: was Du Pont, and its strategies, an added value to the European economic growth?

In Switzerland, the strength of the national economy has been traditionally related with the nation’s capacity to export goods, services and capital, while the impact of inward direct investments on the national economy has been largely neglected.

The paper analyses the expansion of Swiss companies abroad as well as the activities of foreign companies in Switzerland since the 1950s and especially in the last two decades of the twentieth century, when the link between the competitiveness of the firms and the competitiveness of the nation - as their home-base – lost its traditional strength. Special attention will be given to those years in which major advances in the process of European integration were made, such as the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the creation of the single European market and its extension to the European Economic Area (EEA) between 1985 and 1992. Did Switzerland’s particular position within the overall process of European integration and especially her rejection of the EEA-Treaty in 1992 have a major impact on outbound and inbound FDI?

Compared with the very stable structure of large Swiss MNE since the 1920s, their composition and ranking changed considerably in the 1990s. We can therefore distinguish between a Chandlerian pattern of development characterised by the continued dominance of the same leading multinational companies up until the late 1980s and an evolutionary or Schumpeterian development characterised by a considerable reshuffling among the large MNE and the rising importance of smaller firms and of firms of the service sector. Foreign firms did not have a very prominent role in the Swiss economy, but their impact may still have been considerable, especially in those sectors where the competitiveness of domestic companies was weak. And their importance has clearly been increasing.

The creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 raised the expectation that FDI would increase between member states and from outside its member states. Politically, this increase in economic interdependence between continental European countries and the developed world would serve to encourage the creation of a transatlantic economic community supported not just by political and ideological reasons but also by business interests. This paper demonstrates that in one important case of FDI, the result was precisely the opposite. With the increase of American FDI the leaders of the European automobile chose to reject such an integration offered by Americans during the GATT Rounds of the 1960s, the Dillon Round and the Kennedy Round,and resisted to the enlargement of the EEC. They were not just in favour of the control, and limitation, at domestic levels of FDI in this central sector of post-war economic development, but they also attempted to limit American FDI by using the new European Economic Community as a shield against US multinationals.

This paper examines relations and interplay between local business and foreign multinational corporations in order to explain whether and how inward FDI has contributed to the development of the Russian business. The paper considers, first, the stock of FDI in Russia from 1992 till 2007 to pinpoint industries which have received the most amount of FDI. Next, this paper analyses how these sectors have been transformed as a result of inward FDI. The analysis will then be brought down to the firm level through case studies of domestic business which have partnered up with foreign investors. The final goal is to answer whether the firms integrated foreign capital and technology efficiently and how their interplay contributed to the increase of these firms’ competitiveness in the national and global markets. The findings from this study should bear some implications on how domestic firms in transition economics may increase their competitiveness applying new technologies and management expertise from their foreign partners.

One remarkable feature of the 20th century was the internationalisation of business. Part of the pattern was the emergence of the multinational firm that controlled operations across national boundaries. The dispersion of activities was based on MNC marketing of their products as well as sourcing of inputs. Denmark was a fairly well-developed small country located between some of the leading industrial nations, and in consequence enjoyed the advantages of being host country for a wide variety of inward FDI from advanced multinational firms. The paper focuses on the reception of foreign FDI in terms of the attitudes developed by political parties, authorities, and organisations e.g. labour unions. Twice in the century attitudes in general changed radically; in the late 1920s they became negative, and in the mid-fifties attitudes generally changed towards the positive. The paper will focus on the latter event and present not only the general change in opinions, but also offer a “map of opinions” that characterised the time. The paper documents a high degree of attitude stability, a possible turning point after the millennium change is discussed at the end.